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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CRAIG L. MULFORD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39991-2012 
(District Court No. CV-2009-4313-PI) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Defendant-Respondent, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), 
respectfully submits this Brief in answer to the Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Craig L. Mulford ("Mulford"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Union Pacific machinist Craig L. Mulford filed a Complaint under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. ("FELA"), in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court, Bannock County, Idaho. (R Vol. I, p. 1.) Mulford alleged that he was injured when 
he tripped over a piece of railroad equipment. (R Vol. I, p.3; T p. 204, LL. 16-19. (Cited 
Transcript excerpts are attached to this Brief as Addendum A.» He alleged that he was 
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disabled from employment as a result of his injuries and sought past and future wages 
and lost benefits. (R Vol. I, p. 3-6; T p. 204, LL. 1-3.) Union Pacific answered the 
Complaint, raising Mulford's duty to mitigate his damages as an affirmative defense. (R 
Vol. I, p. 8.) After a four-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict for Union Pacific. (R Vol. 
II, p. 379.) To the question on the Special Verdict, "Was the Defendant negligent, and if 
so, was this negligence a cause, no matter how slight, of the Plaintiffs injuries?" the jury 
responded, "No." (R Vol. II, p. 379, 382.) Judgment was entered (R Vol. II, p. 384) and 
this appeal followed. (R Vol. II, p. 386.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. MULFORD WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO JUROR TAYLOR 
Mulford waived any challenge for cause to Juror #29, Lorin Taylor, based on Mr. 
Taylor's "relationship" to Union Pacific or his alleged bias. Mulford failed to preserve 
this issue for appeal, and the jury verdict should be upheld. 
Cause challenges to prospective jurors are governed by Rule 47 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. That rule makes clear that it is the responsibility of a party, not the 
court, to raise a challenge for cause, and to do so timely. The rule provides: 
Challenges for cause may be made by an attorney at any time 
while questioning a prospective juror, or no later than the 
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conclusion of all questions propounded to an individual 
prospective juror, or the prospective jury if questioned as a 
whole, except that a challenge for cause may be permitted by 
the court at a later time upon a showing of good cause. 
Challenges for cause, as provided by law, must be tried by the 
court. 
I.R.C.P.47(i)(2). 
A. Mulford waived any challenge for cause based on Juror Taylor's 
"relationship" to Union Pacific 
Though he now makes much of Juror Taylor's "relationship" to Union Pacific, 
Mulford did not challenge Juror Taylor for cause on this ground. During voir dire, Juror 
Taylor, disclosed in response to a question by the trial court that his father was an 
employee of Union Pacific. 1 (T p. 61, LL. 20-21. (Cited Transcript excerpts are attached 
to this Brief as Addendum A.)) The trial court asked Taylor, "Is there anything about that 
relationship that he [Taylor's father] has at the railroad that would cause you to be biased 
in this case or could you listen [to] the evidence and decide this case fairly?" (T p. 62, 
IMulford states that Mr. Taylor's brother, grandfathers, and three uncles also worked for 
Union Pacific. (Plaintiffs Op. Br. at 19.) Mulford cites as support a section of the 
transcript that does not identifY which potential juror is speaking. (T p. 112, LL. 6-15.) 
However, the Court cannot "speculate on something the record does not show." Pierson 
v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 533, 768 P.2d 792, 796 (Ct. App. 1989) (court cannot evaluate 
argument on appeal that tone and gestures used in cross-examination constituted attack 
on credibility triggering right to offer evidence of character for truthfulness because 
record did not reflect tone or gestures). 
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LL. 1-4.) Taylor responded, "I can help decide it fairly." (T p. 62, LL. 5-6.) The trial 
court then asked the parties if they had "[a]ny challenge for cause at this point in time." 
(T p. 65, LL. 2-3.) Mulford's attorney replied, "Not at this point, Your Honor." (T p. 65, 
L. 5.) 
Rule 47(h) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the grounds for 
challenge for cause.2 The grounds include, "Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth 
degree to any party." I.R.C.P. 47(h)(2). "Consanguinity is blood relationship by birth; 
affinity is relationship by marriage. The outer limits of relationship to the fourth degree 
include great aunts and uncles, first cousins, and grand nieces and nephews." Idaho Trial 
Handbook § 6: 17 (2d ed.). 
How blood relationship by birth could possibly apply to a juror whose father is an 
employee of a defendant corporation is a puzzling issue Mulford does not address. 
Mulford does not present any case law applying the consanguinity concept to a corporate 
party, and Union Pacific has found none. Whatever Mulford's unexpressed rationale for 
believing that Rule 47(h)(2) applies here, his argument fails because he did not raise a 
challenge for cause at trial. When the trial court asked the parties whether they had any 
2Mulford also relies on Idaho Code Sections 19-2019 and 19-2020, which establish 
statutory grounds for implied bias that may form the basis of a challenge for cause in a 
criminal case. The statutes do not apply in this civil case. 
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challenges for cause, Mulford's attorney replied, "Not at this point, Your Honor." (T p. 
65, L. 5.) Neither at that point nor at any other point did Mulford's attorney raise a 
challenge for cause based on Juror Taylor's "relationship" to Union Pacific. At the 
conclusion of voir dire, Mulford passed the panel for cause. (R Vol. II, p. 368; T p. 122, 
LL. 6-8.) When the jury was seated, the trial court asked the parties if they had any 
objection to the jury as seated. (T p. 131, L. 20-22.) Mulford's attorney answered in the 
negative. (T p. 131, LL. 23-24.) 
In Morris v. Thomson, this Court considered a case in which the plaintiff had 
"failed to challenge for cause the majority of [the] jurors" that he argued on appeal 
should have been excluded from the jury because they had a business relationship with 
the defendant physician. 130 Idaho 138, 141,937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997). This Court 
held, "[ w ]ith regard to the ... jurors plaintiff failed to challenge, plaintiff waived all 
objections to them by passing them for cause." Id. This Court further held that the 
plaintiff's waiver was a failure to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. Because Mulford did 
not raise a challenge for cause at trial, Mulford waived this point of error. 
B. Mulford waived any challenge for cause based on alleged bias 
Likewise, Mulford waived any challenge to Juror Taylor based on bias. After the 
trial court's voir dire questioning, Mulford's attorney questioned the panel. He directed 
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the following question to the entire panel: "The law allows pain and suffering to be 
compensable. That's the judge's instruction that that's one of the items of damages. Are 
there any of you who would say, no, Ijust won't give you that, Mr. Larsen and Mr. 
Mulford, no matter what you do?" (T p. 87, LL. 8-12.) Mr. Taylor raised his hand. (T p. 
87, L. 13.) Mr. Taylor and Mulford's counsel then had this exchange: 
Potential Juror #29 [Lorin Taylor]: It's more personal 
opinion that I do believe that if somebody' s going to be 
covered for lost wages, compensation, hospital bills and stuff 
like that, why further it for pain and suffering? I was injured 
on the workforce too. I didn't get any lawsuit. I didn't get any 
money. And that's okay, because there's programs out there 
for everything. And, you know, I got my lost wages, but I 
didn't get any pain and suffering. But the hospital bills were 
paid. 
Mr. Larsen: So in this case for an item of damage of pain 
and suffering could you follow the law? And if the law in fact 
supports that Mr. Mulford is entitled to money damages for 
pain and suffering could you award that given your 
experience? 
Potential Juror #29: I don't believe so. 
Mr. Larsen: You couldn't be fair to Mr. Mulford on that 
issue no matter what? 
Potential Juror #29: I believe that I can be fair on both sides. 
Pain and suffering is one thing but if he still gets lost wages, 
retirement, and hospital bills covered, that's a lot of pain and 
suffering in itself right there. 
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Mr. Larsen: They're separate damages. And that's why I ask 
this, because I want to make sure they're going to be fair on 
every aspect of this. And ifthere's a certain aspect of damage 
that you just say I don't believe it, cowboy up and move on, I 
want to know that. That would be an indication that you may 
not be able to follow the judge's instructions. 
Potential Juror #29: Okay. Yeah. I don't believe that pain 
and suffering should be entered for compensation. 
(T p. 87, L. 20-p. 89, L. 4.) 
After this exchange, Mulford's attorney made a motion to remove Mr. Taylor for 
cause. (T p. 89, LL. 5-6.) In response, the trial court rehabilitated Mr. Taylor as follows: 
The Court: Just a second. Let me ask a question. Mr. Taylor, 
in this particular case, the judge dictates or tells the jury what 
the law in Idaho is, what the duties are, what the 
responsibilities of the parties are to each other, and what the 
damages are that can be awarded if the evidence supports it. 
If I were to instruct you that certain items of damages are 
compensable and you believe that the evidence supported 
those items of damage, would you follow my instructions and 
award the damages that you think the evidence would 
support? 
Potential Juror #29: Yes. 
The Court: Okay. Thank you. You may proceed. 
Mr. Larsen: And that would include an item for pain and 
suffering? 
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Potential Juror #29: Okay. Like I said, just a personal 
opmlOnso-
Mr. Larsen: Okay. I appreciate that. 
(T p. 89, L. 8-p. 90, L. 3.) 
Mulford's counsel elected not to renew his challenge to Mr. Taylor for cause. (T p. 
90, L. 13.) He continued his questioning of other potential jurors and, shortly thereafter, 
stated, "Okay, I don't have anything else, Your Honor." (T p. 91, LL. 15-16.) 
As stated above, at the conclusion of voir dire, Mulford's counsel passed the panel 
for cause without renewing his challenge to Mr. Taylor. (R Vol. II, p. 368; T p. 122, LL. 
6-8.) The parties exercised their peremptory challenges. (T p. 130, LL. 23-25.) Mulford's 
counsel failed to use a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor was seated 
and the trial court asked the parties if they had any objection to the jury as seated. (T p. 
131, LL. 13-14; p. 131, LL. 20-22.) Mulford's attorney answered in the negative. (T p. 
131, LL. 23-24.) Mr. Taylor served as the Presiding Juror. (R Vol. II, pp. 380, 383.) 
Under Rule 47 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the grounds for a cause 
challenge to a potential juror include "existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing 
enmity or bias to or against either party." LR.C.P. 47(h)(7). Mulford challenged Mr. 
Taylor for cause based on bias, but Juror Taylor then assured the trial court that he could 
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be fair. Far from lecturing Mr. Taylor that he must do what he was told, or instructing 
him that he was not a dog but a cat, (PI's Op. Br. at 21), the trial court asked Mr. Taylor 
an open ended question: "If I were to instruct you that certain items of damages are 
compensable and you believe that the evidence supported those items of damage, would 
you follow my instructions and award the damages that you think the evidence would 
support?" (T p. 89, LL. 15-20.) Mr. Taylor unequivocally responded, "Yes." (T p. 89, L 
21.) 
The trial court acted properly in rehabilitating Mr. Taylor. "'[A] trial court does 
not abuse its discretion by refusing to excuse for cause jurors whose answers during voir 
dire initially give rise to challenges for cause but who later assure the court that they will 
be able to remain fair and impartial.'" Nightengale v. Timmel151 Idaho, 345, 353,256 
P.3d 755, 761 (2011) (quoting Morris, 130 Idaho at 141, 937 P.2d at 1215). "[T]he court 
is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons concerning partiality or bias." Id. 
After Mr. Taylor assured the trial court that he would follow the court's 
instructions and award the damages the evidence would support, Mulford raised no 
further challenge for cause and ultimately passed the jury, including Mr. Taylor, for 
cause. Mulford chose not to exercise one of his four peremptory challenges to strike Juror 
Taylor. This alone is fatal to his argument on appeal. "[R]efusing to grant a challenge for 
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cause 'is grounds for reversal only if the [party] exhausts all peremptory challenges and 
an incompetent juror is forced upon him.'" Id. at 354, 256 P.3d at 762 (quoting 47 
AmJur.2d Jury 2 § 205 (2006)). Thus, even when a party must use a peremptory 
challenge to strike a juror that should have been excused for cause by the trial court, this 
alone is not grounds for reversal. "[T]he party must [also] show on appeal that 'he was 
prejudiced by being required to use a peremptory challenge to remove [the juror].'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 570, 808 P.2d 1313, 1315 (1991) (final alteration 
in original)). This requires a showing that '''remaining jurors on the panel were not 
impartial or were biased.'" Id. (quoting Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570,808 P.2d at 1315). 
To have an appealable issue, Mulford must have first exercised a peremptory 
challenge to strike Mr. Taylor and then demonstrated to this Court that he suffered 
prejudice because a member of the actual jury was incompetent. Mulford has done 
neither. He chose not to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Taylor, and has not 
attempted to demonstrate on appeal that some other member of the jury was incompetent. 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals stated with respect to a similar situation, "We can infer 
from these facts that the jury was satisfactory ... at the outset of trial." State v. Hoffman, 
109 Idaho 127, 130, 705 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Ct. App. 1985) (criminal defendant failed to 
show that he was deprived of impartial jury where his experienced trial counsel neither 
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challenged the juror in question for cause, nor peremptorily removed juror, nor showed 
evidence of juror bias or misconduct during trial). This Court should not consider 
Mulford's hindsight claim of error. The trial court did not "ignore[] its duty," as Mulford 
argues. (PI's Op. Br. at 20.) Mulford simply failed to raise a timely challenge for cause 
pursuant to Rule 47. He waived this point of error and is not entitled to a new trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY 
BENEFITS AFTER MULFORD OPENED THE DOOR 
The trial court's ruling that Mulford opened the door to evidence that his disability 
benefits influenced his mitigation efforts was a proper exercise of the court's discretion, 
as was the court's denial of Mulford's motion for a new trial on the same grounds. 
A. The trial COUlt reserved ruling on Mulford's pretrial motion to exclude 
evidence of RRB benefits 
Mulford filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude evidence of "[ c ]ollateral 
source benefits." (R Vol. I, p. 21.) At the time of trial, Mulford was receiving disability 
benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board. (R Vol. I, p. 185.) The United States 
Railroad Retirement Board ("RRB") is a governmental entity that administers retirement 
and disability benefits for railroad employees. (R Vol. II, p. 198-99.) Mulford argued in 
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his pretrial motion in limine that evidence that he received RRB benefits was 
inadmissible under the collateral source rule. (R Vol. I, p. 185.) 
In support of his motion, Mulford filed a copy of the transcript of the second of 
two depositions he gave in the case. (R Vol. I, p. 82.) Despite his duty to mitigate his 
damages and work full time, if possible, Mulford testified in his deposition that he only 
wanted to work part time because he did not want to jeopardize his RRB benefits. The 
exchange was as follows: 
Q: [W]hy is it you told him you only wanted to work part-
time? 
A: Because it didn't pay enough money to make it worth 
my while, but if I could work part-time, I could 
supplement my income. 
Q: How much would they have to pay to make it worth 
your while? 
A: Well, I think-
MR. [LARSEN]: And I'm going to object to the form of the 
question as it calls for collateral source 
infonnation. But you can answer. 
A: I believe the social security says I can make $780 a 
month. 
Q: Before you start losing RRB Payments? 
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A: Yes. If I make a penny over that, I lose the whole 
month. 
Q: I see. So what you're saying is that, as a full-time job 
at Ron's Rocky Mountain, they didn't pay enough to 
make up for you losing your RRB payments; is that 
right? 
A: (Witness nodded head.) 
Q: Is that right? 
A: Right. 
Q: Okay. And so you wanted to find ajob that you could 
make something less than $780 a month? 
A: Yes. 
(R Vol. I, pp. 94-95.) 
Because of this testimony, the parties and the trial court all were aware that, if 
Mulford gave affirmative testimony about why he was only interested in part-time work, 
Mulford's receipt ofRRB benefits would become admissible. The trial court issued a 
written order reserving ruling on Mulford's motion until trial. (R Vol. II, p. 306.) 
B. The trial court permitted evidence of disability benefits after Mulford 
opened the door 
Mulford was the first trial witness. (T p. 135, LL. 15-17. (Cited Transcript 
excerpts are attached to this Brief as Addendum A.)) During direct examination, he 
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opened the door to evidence of disability benefits when he gave a misleading answer in 
response to his own attorney's question about his efforts to find employment. 
Q. Have you looked for any other employment? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. What have you looked for? 
A. I've looked for a lot of part-time work because I would 
like to get into finding out how I would be able to 
work or if I could even work. So I've applied to a lot 
of auto parts stores, Converges, Sears. I can't 
remember everything, but-Home Depot. 
(T p. 201, L. 17-p. 202, L. 1.) 
On cross-examination, Mulford testified: 
Q. [Y]ou told the jury that you've been applying for part-
time jobs? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that the reason that you were applying for part-
time jobs is because you wanted to see if you're able 
to do the job and maybe work full-time, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's not the only reason that you're applying for 
part-time jobs is it? 
(T p. 250, LL. 13-22.) 
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Mulford's counsel objected that "this raises an issue that we addressed in our 
motion in limine." (T p. 250, LL. 23-25.) Union Pacific responded that Mulford had 
opened the door to the evidence. The trial court overruled Mulford's objection. (T p. 251, 
LL. 1-3.) Counsel for Union Pacific rephrased the question and, without further objection 
from Mulford's counsel, Mulford testified: 
Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Mr. Mulford, it's not the only 
reason, is it? It's not just because you want to see if you're 
physically able to do the job. There's another reason that 
you're only applying for part-time work isn't there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that? 
A. Because I'm limited to only so much amount of money 
to make. 
(T p. 251, LL. 4-12.) 
Union Pacific then asked follow-up questions to which Mulford's counsel objected 
only on grounds of relevance and that the question had been asked and answered. (T p. 
252, LL. 1-2.) The objections were overruled and Mulford elaborated, "I can make $780 
a month, and if I make any over that 1 lose my retirement." (T p. 252, LL. 5-15.) 
Mulford testified further: 
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Q. And you testified in your deposition that you only 
applied for part-time work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you said it was because they didn't pay enough 
money to make it worthwhile. Do you recall that 
testimony? 
A. To lose my-no, yes, it's true. 
Q. The full-time job? 
A. The full-time job. 
Q. Didn't pay enough money to make it worth your 
while? 
(T p. 252, L. 24-p. 253, L. 9.) 
Mulford's counsel objected, again on grounds of relevance and that the question 
had been asked and answered. The trial court overruled the objections. (T p. 253, LL. 10-
14.) Counsel for Union Pacific restated the question and, again without further objection 
from Mulford's counsel, Mulford testified: 
Q. Why is it that full-time work at Ron's Automotive 
otherwise would not be something that you would 
want? 
A. Because it makes less money than what I'm getting on 
my retirement. 
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(T p. 253, L. 22-p. 254, L. 1.) 
Mulford's counsel then moved to strike the testimony and the trial court denied the 
motion. (T p. 254, LL. 3-5.) 
C. The trial court denied Mulford's motion for new trial 
Although the only objections raised were relevance and repetition, Mulford moved 
for a mistrial on the ground that the trial court should have excluded the evidence under a 
Rule 403 balancing test. (T p. 257, LL. 23-25.) The trial court heard argument outside the 
presence of the jury and denied the motion, reasoning as follows: 
THE COURT: The reason that I sustained--or overruled 
your objections is that your-if Mr. Mulford had not testified 
on direct examination as to the reason he was only looking for 
part-time work, then none of that would have come in. But 
once you asked him that question and he said the reason that 
he only went for part-time work is because-the only reason 
is because he wanted to see if he could do it, that opened the 
door. The defendant at that point in the time is certainly 
entitled to identifY for the jury that he's got other reasons that 
he does not-he's only seeking part-time work. That's-
mitigation is an issue here. I wouldn't have allowed it based 
on my earlier rulings except for the fact that that's how he 
testified on direct. That's the problem. 
(T p. 257, LL. 4-19.) 
The trial court later ruled that Mulford's testimony that he would lose his 
retirement ifhe made more than $780 a month was beyond the scope of Union Pacific's 
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question and was not responsive. The trial court offered to strike that portion of the 
testimony or give a cautionary instruction. Mulford declined. (T p. 321, L. 21-p. 322, L. 
25.) Nevertheless, the trial court would not permit Union Pacific to use the testimony on 
the substantive issue of damages, but only to comment on Mulford's credibility. (T p. 
323, LL. 1-18.) 
The trial court reasoned as follows: 
My view is that the testimony of the plaintiff as it went 
to the reasons for-the reasons that he was not seeking 
anything more than part-time work goes to his credibility. 
Because he offered an explanation, but it wasn't the full 
explanation. 
And because I felt that he'd opened the door on that I 
allowed the defendant to inquire are there any other reasons 
and he offered the testimony that he did. We talked about it as 
RRB. He never said Railroad Retirement Benefits. He just 
said retirement benefits or benefits or something like that. 
And so they don't know what it is or how much it is,3 and we 
have the testimony of Mr. Opp4 that ifhe had worked-
continued to work until age 66, he could have put more 
3Mulford argues that "[i]t is clear" that Juror Taylor, "with his background and 
knowledge of UP obviously informed and instructed the jury that Mr. Mulford was 
receiving RRB benefits culminating in its decision to render its verdict against him." (PI's 
Op. Br. at 25.) This is neither clear nor obvious. In fact, there is no record support for 
Mulford's assertion. Nevertheless, the trial court limited Union Pacific's use of the 
testimony concerning retirement benefits to the non-substantive issue of credibility and 
offered to issue a cautionary instruction, which Mulford declined. 
4Mr. Opp was Mulford's expert economist. He presented Mulford's damages calculations 
to the jury. 
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money into the retirement benefit, and he's lost that. So I 
think that's kind of offset I think in terms of the testimony ... 
So my view is that his testimony goes to his 
credibility, but it doesn't-it's not substantive in the sense of 
what are his damages, which is really what the mitigation 
question is. 
And so for those reasons I'm ruling that the defendant 
when they call [the vocational rehabilitation expert] may not 
have him refer to any ofthe reasons that he was only seeking 
part-time work, may not refer to any of his railroad retirement 
disability benefits in any way, in any dollar amount, can't 
even make any mention of it. ... 
And I'm not going to allow the defendant to argue that 
in closing argument either. 
(T p. 321, L1. 24-p. 322,1. 16; p. 323, L1. 7-18; p. 323, 1. 24-p. 324,1. 1; see also T p. 
263, 1. 24-p. 2641. 20.) 
D. This Court reviews the trial court's admission of evidence of RRB 
benefits and denial of Mulford's motion for new trial for abuse of 
discretion 
Mulford argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 
disability benefits and denying his motion for a new trial. To prevail, Mulford must show 
both that the trial court's rulings were an abuse of discretion and that the errors affected a 
substantial right. Hurtado v. Land o 'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13,278 P.3d 415,420 (2012) 
("'Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless 
the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the 
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party is affected.'" (quoting Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 
574,903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995)); Stoddard v. Nelson, 991 Idaho 293,298,581 P.2d 339, 
344 (1978) ("[g]ranting or denying a motion for new trial is within the discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion"); 
Hurtado, 153 Idaho 13,278 P.3d at 420 (court "'will grant a new trial only if the error 
affected a substantial right'" (quoting State ex ref. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. 
P'ship, 148 Idaho 718, 726, 228 P.3d 985,993 (2010)); see also I.R.E. 103(a); I.R.C.P. 
61. Mulford cannot meet this burden. 
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court follows the 
following three-part analysis: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and 
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. 
State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 686,273 P.3d 1271, 1279 (2012) (reviewing 
evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion). 
As discussed in detail below, Mulford's argument fails because the trial court 
reached its rulings by an exercise of reason consistent with applicable legal standards. 
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Further, Mulford cannot demonstrate that he suffered impairment of a substantial right 
because the challenged rulings relate to damages. In this case, the jury found that Union 
Pacific was not negligent. Consequently, it did not reach the issue of damages. Allegedly 
erroneous rulings related to damages do not affect a substantial right when the jury does 
not reach the question of damages. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 355,256 P.3d at 763. 
"[T]herefore even if [the trial court's] rulings were error, such errors were harmless." Id. 
E. Neither Idaho Law nor the Eichel opinion shields Mulford from vigorous 
cross-examination to rebut misleading testimony 
Mulford's affirmative testimony on direct examination made his receipt of RRB 
benefits relevant rebuttal evidence. Idaho law clearly recognizes that otherwise 
inadmissible evidence becomes admissible for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal when 
the plaintiff's affirmative testimony opens the door. 5 State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 
512-13,988 P.2d 1170, 1186-87 (1999) (in murder trial, direct testimony that, before 
5 Section 6-1606 of the Idaho Code, cited by Mulford, (PI's Op. Br. at 22), provides for 
post-judgment setoff of collateral source benefits. The statute is inapplicable because the 
issue of damages in FELA cases is governed by federal law. Norfolk & w. Ry. Co. v. 
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1980). 
Further, Union Pacific does not concede that RRB benefits are collateral source 
benefits. Benefits received from the Railroad Retirement disability system are not 
compensation that is independent of the railroad employer. Rather, these benefits are 
funded by a substantial contribution of the employer. The Eichel decision did not 
consider this point, as the issue was not before the Court. Nevertheless, some court 
opinions have referred to RRB benefits as "collateral source" benefits. 
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murders for which he was charged, defendant had never fired murder weapon, pointed a 
gun at anyone, or seen anyone shot opened door to prior bad acts evidence); State v. 
Mace, 133 Idaho 903,906,994 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Ct. App. 2000) (in DUI trial, direct 
testimony that defendant did not drink and drive opened door to prior DUI conviction); 
State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 162, 898 P2d 615,621 (Ct. App. 1995) (in child abuse 
trial, direct testimony that defendant had never engaged in inappropriate discipline 
opened door to prior bad acts evidence). Evidence of collateral source payments is not 
exempt from this basic rule of evidence. Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 535-36, 768 
P.2d 792, 798-99 (Ct. App. 1989) (evidence of life insurance coverage properly admitted 
in wrongful death case to rebut claim of diminished income resulting from spouse's 
death). 
Federal cases addressing admissibility of evidence of disability benefits in FELA 
cases likewise recognize that evidence ofRRB benefits is admissible when, as here, the 
plaintiff opens the door by offering misleading testimony on direct examination. In Eichel 
v. New York Central Railroad Co., the United States Supreme Court held that "the 
likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of' evidence that a plaintiff 
in an FELA case receives benefits under the federal Railroad Retirement Act. 375 U.S. 
253,255 (1963) (per curiam). However, unlike this case, the plaintiff in Eichel "had not 
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affirmatively testified in such a manner as to warrant any effort at contradiction by cross-
examination. Instead, defendant there attempted to introduce prejudicial evidence of 
disability pension payments simply because it was logically relevant on the extent and 
duration of the plaintiffs disability." Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480,483 
(3rd Cir. 1967). 
Contrary to Mulford's argument, Eichel does not require the per se exclusion of 
evidence ofRRB benefits in FELA cases. McGrath v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 136 F.3d 
838, 841 (lst Cir. 1998) ("[W]e do not believe that the Eichel court established a bright-
line rule barring the admission of collateral source evidence on the issue of 
malingering."); Moses v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F.3d 413,416 (8th Cir. 1995) ("where 
plaintiff s case itself has made the existence of collateral sources of probative value, we 
have allowed proof of them"). Indeed, "[t]he barriers which have been created against the 
admission of otherwise relevant evidence because of its prejudicial effect do not extend 
to the affirmative volunteering by a plaintiff of testimony which breaks into this restricted 
area." Gladden, 385 F.2d at 483-84; accord Lange v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 703 F.2d 
322, 324 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("scope of pennissible inquiry is set by the direct 
examination and the usual rules on cross-examination apply"); Ferren v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., No. 00C2262, 2001 WL 1607586, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,2001) 
23 
(unpublished disposition attached to this Brief as Addendum B) ("the limitation created 
by the collateral source rule has itself a significant limitation"). Therefore, the fact that 
Mulford testified on direct examination in such a manner as to warrant an effort on the 
part of Union Pacific at contradiction by cross-examination is dispositive of this issue on 
appeal. 
Evidence ofRRB benefits becomes admissible when, as here, "the plaintiffs 
direct testimony misleads the jury on some issue in the case and cross-examination ofthe 
plaintiff on evidence of collateral source payments is necessary to rebut the testimony." 
Lange, 703 F.2d at 324. For example, evidence of benefits payments made to a plaintiff 
or on his behalf "may be admissible if the plaintiff puts his financial status at issue." 
Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265,273 (2nd Cir. 1996); Moore v. 
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 825 S.W.2d 839, 842-43 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (evidence of 
benefits admissible after plaintiff opened door by testifYing that he could not afford 
physical therapy). Similarly, if "a plaintiff asserts that he does not have [insurance] 
coverage, then the defense may show that he does." Moses, 64 F.3d at 416. And "if a 
plaintiff is claiming emotional injury on account of financial stress following an accident, 
then defendant may inquire into collateral sources since these, ifthere are any, would 
tend to reduce the plaintiffs stress." ld. 
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In Lange v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, the plaintiff railroad employee 
testified on direct examination that he had returned to work immediately after surgery 
because he had no savings or disability income to support himself and his family while 
offwork. 703 F.2d at 323-24. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in a per curiam 
opinion that evidence of benefits payments plaintiff had received while off work "was 
relevant to test the credibility of plaintiff s assertion that he had to return to work 
immediately after surgery because he had no disability income. It was also necessary to 
protect the full range of inquiry allowed by cross-examination, a fundamental part of the 
adversary system." Id. at 324. 
Similarly, in Gladden v. P. Henderson & Company, the plaintiff testified that he 
had not returned to see a physician because he had gotten behind on his bills while he 
was offwork. 385 F.2d at 482. He testified that he had gone back to work to catch up on 
his bills and support his family. Id. During cross-examination, defendant's counsel sought 
to introduce evidence that plaintiff had received disability benefits while he was offwork. 
Id. The trial court admitted the evidence and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Id. at 483. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the 
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plaintiff on direct examination brought into the case an 
additional, affirmative element by testifying that he had 
returned to work and had not visited [his physician] again 
because he had fallen behind in the payment of his bills and 
wanted to catch up on them and support his family. Defendant 
was not required to leave this testimony unchallenged and had 
the right to ask plaintiff on cross-examination whether he had 
received financial assistance, as affecting the credibility of his 
assertion. To have forbidden such cross-examination would 
have conferred on plaintiff the unparalleled right to give 
testimony on direct examination with immunity from inquiry 
on cross-examination. This is what distinguishes the present 
case from Eichel[.] 
Id.; accord Crowther v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 680 F.3d 95, 100 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(plaintiffs own testimony "elevated the benefits evidence from merely circumstantial to 
a component of direct evidence of purposeful malingering"). 
Just as the plaintiffs in the Gladden and Lange decisions, Mulford's direct 
testimony misled the jury, and cross-examination on evidence ofRRB benefits was 
necessary to rebut the testimony. Mulford argues on appeal that the trial court ruled that 
he had opened the door to evidence ofRRB benefits simply by testifying that he had 
looked for part-time work. (PI's Op. Br. at 24.) Mulford's argument is not supported by 
the record. 
With knowledge of Mulford's deposition testimony that he was seeking only part-
time work to avoid jeopardizing his retirement benefits, Mulford's attorney asked him 
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during direct examination what jobs he had looked for. Mulford responded, "I've looked 
for a lot of part-time work because] would like to get into finding out how] would be 
able to work or if] could even work." (T p. 201, LL. 20-23 (emphasis added).) As the 
trial court ruled, Mulford "offered an explanation, but it wasn't the full explanation." (T 
p. 322, LL. 2-4.) His misleading testimony suggested to the jury that, because of his 
injury, he may not be physically capable of working a full-time job. Unchallenged, 
Mulford's misleading testimony had a strong potential to unfairly gain the jurors' 
sympathy by exaggerating the severity of his injuries, thereby increasing an award of 
damages. His affirmative testimony made his receipt of disability benefits relevant 
rebuttal evidence. 
In denying Mulford's motion for mistrial, the trial court ruled that, 
if Mr. Mulford had not testified on direct examination as to 
the reason he was only lookingfor part-time work, then none 
of that would have come in. But once you asked him that 
question and he said the reason that he only went for part-
time work is because-the only reason is because he wanted 
to see if you could do it, that opened the door. The defendant 
at that point in time is certainly entitled to identify for the jury 
that he's got other reasons that he does not-he's only 
seeking part-time work. 
(T p. 257, LL. 5-15 (emphasis added)). 
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The trial court's ruling and reasoning are fully consistent with the FELA 
decisions, including the Gladden decision, in which the court ruled: 
If plaintiff had not added his affirmative testimony on direct 
examination he would have had the advantage of the 
collateral benefit rule and the jury would have been required 
to assess his damages without any knowledge of the collateral 
benefit he received .... But the collateral benefit rule cannot 
be made a springboard from which a plaintiff may go forward 
with affirmative evidence that he returned to work while he 
was still ailing, because of financial need and then seek 
immunity from cross-examination regarding it. The boundary 
of silence was crossed when plaintiff affirmatively presented 
on direct examination the reason why he had returned to work 
after seven weeks and had not again visited his physician. The 
trial court therefore was justified in opening the door for 
cross-examination for the narrow purpose of testing the 
credibility of plaintiff s assertion. 
385 F.2d at 484. 
The trial court offered to strike the portion of Mulford's testimony in which he 
told the jury how much monthly income would result in a loss of his retirement benefits. 
The trial court also offered to issue a cautionary instruction to the jury. "Trial courts can 
minimize any prejudice ... by offering to give a cautionary instruction .... Historically 
this Court has expressed its confidence that juries will follow such a cautionary 
instruction." Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 834, 828 P.2d 854, 862 (Idaho 1992) 
(voir dire questions about insurance company advertisement concerning effect of jury 
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verdicts on insurance costs permissible with cautionary instruction). Nevertheless, 
Mulford declined both offers. (T p. 322, LL. 20-25.) 
Though Mulford did not request it, the trial court limited Union Pacific's use of 
the evidence ofRRB benefits to the issue of Mulford's credibility. (T p. 324, LL. 2-17.) 
If there was any potential for unfair prejudice associated with admission of the evidence, 
it was eliminated by the trial court's careful ruling that the evidence could not be used for 
any substantive purpose. 
Mulford opened the door to evidence that receipt of disability benefits affected his 
efforts to mitigate his damages by finding other employment. It was within the trial 
court's discretion to permit cross-examination on the issue for the narrow purpose of 
testing Mulford's credibility. The trial court's evidentiary ruing and subsequent denial of 
Mulford's motion for new trial were supported by an exercise of reason and were 
consistent "with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it." 
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 686,273 P.3d at 1279. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Nevertheless, even ifthe trial court's rulings were erroneous, Mulford did not 
suffer impairment of a substantial right. The jury found that Union Pacific was not 
negligent. Therefore, it never reached the question of damages. For this reason, the trial 
court's rulings, even if erroneous, were harmless. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 355,256 
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P.3d at 763. This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings and the jury verdict should 
stand. 
III. MULFORD Is NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Mulford is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. Under Idaho law, 
attorney fees can be awarded on appeal only to a prevailing party, and only when the 
appeal was defended "frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." MBNA Am. 
Bank, NA. v McGoldrick, 148 Idaho 56,60,218 P.3d 785, 789 (2008). Union Pacific's 
defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Substantial competent 
authority supports Union Pacific's positions on appeal. This Court should decline 
Mulford's invitation to enter an award of attorney fees in his favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Mulford has presented no grounds for overturning the verdict rendered by the jury 
in this case. First, Mulford did not raise a challenge for cause to Juror Taylor based on a 
"relationship" to Union Pacific. Mulford raised but then abandoned a challenge for cause 
to Juror Taylor based on bias. He passed the jury for cause and then elected not to use a 
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peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Taylor. Mulford waived any challenge to Juror Taylor 
and is not entitled to a new trial. 
Second, Mulford opened the door to the admissibility of evidence that he received 
disability benefits when, during direct examination, he gave a misleading explanation for 
his choice to search for only part-time work. In a proper exercise of discretion, the trial 
court permitted cross-examination on the issue for the narrow purpose of testing 
Mulford's credibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence 
or denying Mulford's motion for new trial. Nevertheless, if the trial court's rulings were 
erroneous, the errors were harmless because they related to an issue the jury did not 
reach. This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings. 
Finally, this Court should deny Mulford's request for attorney fees. Union 
Pacific's defense of this appeal is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
Substantial competent authority supports Union Pacific's positions. 
For these reasons, Union Pacific urges this Court to reject Mulford's arguments on 
appeal and uphold the trial court's rulings and the jury's verdict. 
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DATED this 8th day of April, 2013. 
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ADDENDUM A 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CRAIG L. MULFORD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 
) 39991-2012 
) 
) Bannock County 
) Court No. 
) 2009-4313-PI 
) 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Bannock, Stephen S. Dunn, 
District Judge, presiding. 
Sheila Fish 
RPR, CSR 
1 Employer's Liability Act which allows the plaintiff 
2 to bring this claim against the railroad. 
3 Other than what I've just explained to 
4 you, do either of you know anything more about this 
5 case from any source? 
6 POTENTIALJUROR #41: No. 
7 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
8 THE COURT: Are either of you acquainted 
9 with any family member of either party? 
10 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
11 POTENTIALJUROR #29: No. 
12 THE COURT: Do you have any kind of 
13 relationship with the parties such as 
14 employer/employee, debtor/creditor, attorney/client, 
15 master/servant, that kind of a relationship? 
16 POTENTIALJUROR #41: No. 
17 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: Tell me what your relationship 
19 is. 
20 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: My father's an 
21 employee of Union Pacific. 
22 THE COURT: Your father's an employee of the 
23 railroad. All right. And so you don't have that 
24 relationship. Your father does. 
25 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes. 
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1 the lawyers, the lawyers representing the railroad, 
2 Mr. Densely and Mr. Hayden, or for the plaintiff, 
3 Mr. Larsen and Mr. Gabiola? 
4 POTENTIALJUROR #29: No. 
5 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Let's see. I need 
7 to read some names: Craig Mulford, Carol Mulford, 
8 Gary Brandt, Kevin O'Neil, Dr. Wathne, Nancy Collins, 
9 Stephen Morrissey, Michael Freeman, Jeffrey Opp, Dan 
10 Camacho, John Baker, AI Davis, Kurt Hegmann, a 
11 Dr. George Page, and Bob Van Iderstine. Do either of 
12 you know any of those witnesses? 
13 POTENTIALJUROR #29: No. 
14 THE COURT: Who do you know? 
15 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I don't know. 
16 THE COURT: Do you know any of them? 
17 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: One name sounds 
18 familiar, Dan Camacho, from years ago. 
19 THE COURT: Nothing about that relationship 
20 that would bias you today? 
21 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Do you know any other 
23 person in this panel, either one of you? 
24 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
25 POTENTIALJUROR #29: No. 
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1 THE COURT: Is there anything about that 
2 relationship that he has at the railroad that would 
3 cause you to be biased in this case or could you 
4 listen the evidence and decide this case fairly? 
5 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I can help decide it 
6 fairly. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Have either of you ever 
8 been a party to a civil lawsuit? 
9 
10 
11 
POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
THE COURT: Any party ever complained 
12 against you in a criminal case? 
13 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
14 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
15 THE COURT: Have you formed or expressed any 
16 opinion about this case before today? 
17 
18 
19 
POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have a 
20 particular state of mind with regard to claims of 
21 this type that makes you biased as you sit here right 
22 now? 
23 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
24 
25 
POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
THE COURT: Do either one of you know any of 
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1 THE COURT: You don't have any personal 
2 stake in the outcome of the case? 
3 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
4 POTENTIALJUROR #29: No. 
5 THE COURT: Have you previously served on a 
6 jury in your life? 
7 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
8 POTENTIALJUROR #41: No. 
9 THE COURT: Are you willing to follow my 
10 instructions? 
11 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes. 
12 
13 
POTENTIAL JUROR #41: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you think that there's any 
14 reason you could not be a fair and impartial juror in 
15 this case? 
16 POTENTIAL JUROR #41: No. 
17 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
18 THE COURT: All right. And is there any 
19 compelling circumstance going on in your life that 
20 would make it impossible for you to serve on this 
21 jury? 
22 POTENTIALJUROR #41: No. 
23 
24 
POTENTIAL JUROR #29: No. 
THE COURT: See I should have asked all of 
25 ,you the questions that fast. It would have gone much 
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faster. 
2 All right. Any challenge for cause at 
3 this point in time? 
4 MR. DENSLEY: No, Your Honor. 
5 MR. LARSEN: Not at this pOint, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: What's your name and number, 
7 please? Your name? 
8 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Crystal Heath. 
9 THE COURT: Heath? 
10 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes. 
11 MR. LARSEN: 36. 
12 THE COURT: At least these people are 
13 avoiding jail. 36, Ms. Heath, I'm going to ask you a 
14 few questions. 
15 Swear her in. Please stand and raise 
16 your right hand. 
17 (Whereupon the potential juror was 
18 sworn.) 
19 THE COURT: I'm going to ask you a few 
20 questions. I'm going to make it even shorter than I 
21 just did. This is a case where Mr. Mulford is making 
22 a claim against the Union Pacific for injuries he 
23 claims to have sustained to his knees as a result of 
24 the type of work that he was asked to do, and it's 
25 because he tripped over a piece of equipment in 2009. 
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POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Do you know the lawyers, any of 
3 the lawyers from either side? 
4 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to read to you 
6 a list of names: Craig Mulford, Carol Mulford, Gary 
7 Brandt, Kevin O'Neil, Dr. Wathne, Nancy Collins, 
8 Stephen Morrissey, Michael Freeman, Jeffrey Opp, Dan 
9 Camacho, John Baker, AI Davis, Dr. Hegmann, George 
10 Page, and Bob Van Iderstine. Do you know any of 
11 those people? 
12 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. 
13 THE COURT: And do you know any of these 
14 people on this jury panel? 
15 POTENTIALJUROR #36: No. 
16 THE COURT: Have you previously served on a 
17 jury? 
18 POTENTIALJUROR #36: No. 
19 THE COURT: Will you follow my instructions, 
20 my instructions on the law? 
21 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: And can you be fair and 
23 impartial in this case? 
24 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: Is there any kind of compelling 
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1 The railroad claims that the injuries 
2 that he sustained were not caused by his work and 
3 were not caused by his tripping incident. Do you 
4 know anything about this case at all other than me 
5 having explained that to you? 
S POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Do you know any of 
8 these parties or any of the lawyers or does any 
9 member of your family know any of them to your 
10 knowledge? 
11 THE DEFENDANT #36: No, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Have you had any kind of 
13 employee/employer, debtor/creditor, attorney/client 
14 relationship with anybody here? 
15 THE DEFENDANT #36: No, Your Honor. 
is THE COURT: Okay. Have you ever been a 
17 party in a civil lawsuit? 
18 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. 
19 THE COURT: Have any of these parties ever 
20 filed a criminal case against you? 
21 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Do you have any bias or 
23 prejudice against either party? 
24 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. 
25 THE COURT: Can you be fair and impartial? 
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1 circumstance in your life that would make it 
2 impossible for you to serve on this jury? 
3 
4 
POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm almost hoping nobody 
5 else comes in now. 
6 
7 pOint? 
8 
9 
10 
All right. Now pass for cause at this 
MR. LARSEN: At this pOint, yes, Your Honor. 
MR. DENSLEY: No objection. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, 
11 Mr. Larsen. 
12 MR. LARSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Reed 
14 Larsen. I introduced myself to you a little bit. 
15 I'm going to ask you some questions, and I don't mean 
16 to embarrass you or to pry too much, but we want to 
17 find out some of your thoughts and opinions, and I 
18 think it's only fair that you get some background 
19 from me as I ask these questions. 
20 I'll tell you that I live here in 
21 Pocatello. My wife's name is Linda. She is much 
22 more talented and has more ability than I do. She 
23 runs Sunrise Dance Academy out in Chubbuck. We have 
24 three kids. I'm a grandpa which is kind of hard to 
25 imagine. I didn't think that that would happen, and 
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1 Iiker with something elser and it's kind of personal 
2 if I can step out. 
3 MR. LARSEN: Sure. 
4 (In chambers.) 
5 THE COURT: Tell us what your issue is. 
S POTENTIAL JUROR #52: I just wanted to put 
7 this across. All through my school years I had a 
8 really hard timer liker comprehending. I went 
9 throughr Iiker Resource and stuff. So I have a hard 
10 timer liker remembering stuff toor so I just wanted 
11 to be fair on both of the sides. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Okay. 
POTENTIAL JUROR #52: So I just wanted to 
bring that up. 
THE COURT: Nobody's required to have a 
perfect memorYr and you do have a chance to take some 
notes if you want to. Really it comes down to 
whether you'll listen carefully to both sidesr 
consider what all of the other jurors saYr and make 
the fair and best decision that you think that you 
can. 
POTENTIAL JUROR #52: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Can you do that? 
POTENTIAL JUROR #52: I can tryr butr like I 
saidr I just want to be honest about itr andr you 
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1 The next one is pain and suffering. Are 
2 there any of you who feel like if a person's been 
3 injured and has in this instance an injury to their 
4 knees that if they have pain and suffering that they 
5 either should or should not get any compensation for 
6 that pain and suffering? Anyone have any problems 
7 with that concept? 
8 The law allows pain and suffering to be 
9 compensable. That's the judge's instruction that 
10 that's one of the items of damages. Are there any of 
11 you who would saYr nOr I just won't give you thatr 
12 Mr. Larsen and Mr. Mulfordr no matter what you do. 
13 THE COURT: You have a hand over here. 
14 MR. LARSEN: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: Please stand up and tell us your 
16 name again. 
17 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Lorin Taylorr juror 
18 29. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. 
20 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: It's more personal 
21 opinion that I do believe that if somebody's going to 
22 be covered for lost wagesr compensationr hospital 
23 bills and stuff like thatr why further it for pain 
24 and suffering? I was injured on the workforce too. 
25 I didn't get any lawsuit. I didn't get any money. 
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1 knowr going through school it was really rough. 
2 THE COURT: Excellent. Excellent. It's 
3 good to know that. Does anybody have any problem 
4 with that? 
5 MR. LARSEN: I don't have any problem. 
6 MR. DENSLEY: No. 
7 THE COURT: Very good. We can accommodate 
8 that. 
9 (Out of chambers.) 
10 THE COURT: Continue. 
11 MR. LARSEN: As we dealt with this topic of 
12 lawsuits are there any of you who feels like a person 
13 who comes into court and seeks damages either should 
14 or should not be awarded damages? In this case we're 
15 going to be talking about lost wages from being a 
16 machinist at the railroad in the past and in the 
17 future. Anyone have a hard time with that concept 
18 that a person would be or could be entitled to 
19 damages? 
20 The next -- I didn't see anybody raise 
21 their handsr so I'm assuming that that means if the 
22 evidence shows that Mr. Mulford was entitled to 
23 damagesr you'd be able to award him damages that was 
24 consistent with the proof. Anyone have any problem 
25 with that concept at all? 
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1 And that's okaYr because is there's programs out 
2 there for everything. Andr you knowr I got my lost 
3 wagesr but I didn't get any pain and suffering. But 
4 the hospital bills were paid. 
5 MR. LARSEN: So in this case for an item of 
6 damage of pain and suffering could you follow the 
7 law? And if the lawr in factr supports that 
8 Mr. Mulford is entitled to money damages for pain and 
9 sufferingr could you award that given your 
10 experience? 
11 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I don't believe so. 
12 MR. LARSEN: You couldn't be fair to 
13 Mr. Mulford on that issue no matter what? 
14 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: I believe that I can 
15 be fair on both sides. Pain and suffering is one 
16 thingr but if he still gets lost wagesr retirementr 
17 and hospital bills coveredr that's a lot of pain and 
18 suffering in itself right there. 
19 MR. LARSEN: They're separate damages. And 
20 that's why I asked thisr because I want to make sure 
21 that you're going be fair on every aspect of this. 
22 And if there's a certain aspect of damage that you 
23 just say I don't believe in itr cowboy up and move 
24 onr I want to know that. That would be an indication 
25 that you may not be able to follow the judge's 
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instructions. 
2 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Okay. Yeah. I don't 
3 believe that pain and suffering should be entered for 
4 compensation. 
5 MR. LARSEN: All right. I'd move for 
6 excusing for cause, Your Honor. 
7 MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, may we approach. 
8 THE COURT: Just a second. Let me ask a 
9 question. 
10 Mr. Taylor, in this particular case, the 
11 judge dictates or tells the jury what the law in 
12 Idaho is, what the duties are, what the 
13 responsibilities of the parties are to each other, 
14 and what the damages are that can be awarded if the 
15 evidence supports it. If I were to instruct you that 
16 certain items of damages are compensable and you 
17 believe that the evidence supported those items of 
18 damage, would you follow my instructions and award 
19 the damages that you think the evidence would 
20 support? 
21 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
You may proceed. 
22 
23 
24 MR. LARSEN: And that would include an item 
25 for pain and suffering? 
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1 THE COURT: I'll instruct you as to what 
2 measuring stick is. You might not like it, but I'll 
3 instruct you as to it. 
4 POTENTIAL JUROR #57: That's what I was 
5 wondering. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Very good. 
7 MR. LARSEN: You would be willing to follow 
8 that, Mr. Roth? 
9 POTENTIAL JUROR #57: I would. 
10 MR. LARSEN: And we were neighbors sometime 
11 ago. Hopefully I was a good neighbor. Nothing about 
12 that that would affect your ability to be fair to my 
13 client? 
14 
15 
POTENTIAL JUROR #57: Oh, not at all. 
MR. LARSEN: Okay. I don't have anything 
16 else, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 
18 Before we go to you, Mr. Densley, let me 
19 ask Mr. Vialpando some questions. 
20 Mr. Vialpando, as I indicated to you, 
21 this is the case where Mr. Mulford, an employee of 
22 Union Pacific, was working as a machinist, working on 
23 certain equipment and machinery. He claimed that the 
24 activities and job requirements, working conditions 
25 of his job required surgery on his knees and that 
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1 POTENTIAL JUROR #29: Okay. Like I said, 
2 just personal opinion so --
3 MR. LARSEN: Okay. I appreciate that. Is 
4 there anyone else that has similar feelings as it 
5 relates to an item of damage for pain and suffering? 
6 You just think, you know, this is not something that 
7 courts or juries should deal with. 
8 I assume by the fact that nobody's> 
9 raising their hands that you'll all agree that if you 
10 serve as jurors and if the evidence supports it, you 
11 can follow the judge's instructions on that item of 
12 damage. 
13 I don't have anything else. And I 
14 really appreciate your attention. I know it's hot in 
15 here. I appreciate -- did you have a --
16 POTENTIAL JUROR #57: I'm sorry, Donald 
17 Roth, 57. This might be a law issue, but is there a 
18 measuring stick for pain and suffering that will be 
19 taught or given? Because I think it might be 
20 subjective, mine might be different than yours. 
21 MR. LARSEN: Yeah. The measuring stick is 
22 the collective wisdom of the jury. So that's --
23 THE COURT: I'll instruct you as to what the 
24 measuring stick is. 
25 POTENTIAL JUROR #57: I'm sorry. 
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1 Union Pacific was negligent in asking him to do the 
2 type of work to cause those injuries. 
3 He also claims that he tripped over a 
4 piece of equipment in March of 2009 which required 
5 that he needed knee surgery or total knee replacement 
6 earlier than what he otherwise would have done. The 
7 railroad claims that the work did not cause 
8 Mr. Mulford's knee injuries, that they were not 
9 negligent in asking him to do the work that he did, 
10 and that his knee problems were caused by other 
11 things such as prior injuries, family problems, 
12 weight, health, age, that kind of thing. 
13 They deny that they were negligent with 
14 regard to where the piece of eqUipment -- he says the 
15 equipment was improperly stored and that caused him 
16 to trip. They say it was not improperly stored and 
17 that he was not paying attention to what he was 
18 doing. That's the claims of the case. 
19 Do you know anything about this case 
20 other than what I've just told you? 
21 POTENTIAL JUROR #25: Nothing at all. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Are you acquainted 
23 with any of the parties, any of the lawyers, or any 
24 of their the family members? 
25 POTENTIAL JUROR #25: No, I'm not. 
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1 POTENTIAL JUROR #63: No. 
2 MR. DENSLEY: All right. Any other 
3 responses on the knee injuries? 
4 Okay. At this point I think we probably 
5 need to talk to the new juror. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I don't know. Counsel, 
7 approach. 
8 (A discussion was held off the record.) 
9 MR. DENSLEY: All right. I think we're 
10 gOing to go ahead and proceed then. Let me ask if 
11 any of you or members of your family are members of 
12 any kind of labor union? Can we have your raise your 
13 hands there? 
14 Why don't we start with you. Is it 
15 Mr. Vialpando? 
16 POTENTIAL JUROR #25: Vialpando, yes. 
17 MR. DENSLEY: What union is that? 
18 POTENTIAL JUROR #25: It's out of Idaho 
19 Falls. It's a carpenter's union. 
20 MR. DENSLEY: Is that you or a family 
21 member? 
22 POTENTIAL JUROR #25: Family member. 
23 MR. DENSLEY: Is there anything about that 
24 that would impair your ability to act fairly to Union 
25 Pacific especially if asked in this case? 
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1 MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Thank you. I guess 
2 working back this way, who else -- anyone else on 
3 this side raise their hand? Okay. I think I saw 
4 some hands over here. Yes. 
5 POTENTIALJUROR #17: I've got cousins and 
6 family members that are in a steel workers union and 
7 carpenters union out of California and Colorado. 
8 MR. DENSLEY: Anything about that that would 
9 impair your ability to act fairly? 
10 POTENTIALJUROR #17: No. 
11 MR. DENSLEY: Who else? 
12 POTENTIALJUROR #31: 31, Charles Smith. 
13 I'm a member of the NALC, National Association of 
14 Letter Carriers. I'm on the executive board for this 
15 local union, branch 927. 
16 MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Is there anything about 
17 your experience with the union that would impair your 
18 ability to treat Union Pacific fairly? 
19 POTENTIALJUROR #31: Not necessarily. I'd 
20 have to hear the facts. You know, if I am on a 
21 jury -- I think that I could be fair, yes, sir. 
22 MR. DENSLEY: All right. Thank you. Yes. 
23 POTENTIAL JUROR: My husband's a member of 
24 the union for police officers. 
25 MR. DENSLEY: Police officers you said? 
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1 POTENTIAL JUROR #25: No, sir. 
2 MR. DENSLEY: Okay. So -- yes. 
3 POTENTIAL JUROR: I'm not currently a member 
4 of a union but I have brothers who are. 
THE COURT: What unions? 5 
6 POTENTIAL JUROR: Operating engineers and 
7 riders. 
8 MR. DENSLEY: Operating engineers with the 
9 railroad? 
POTENTIAL JUROR: No. No. 10 
11 
12 
MR. DENSLEY: Oh, professional engineers? 
POTENTIAL JUROR: Heavy equipment, 
13 bulldozers, backhoes. 
14 MR. DENSLEY: Is there anything about that 
15 that would impact your ability to act fairly in this 
16 case? 
17 POTENTIAL JUROR: No. 
18 THE COURT: Who was next? Yes, sir. 
19 POTENTIAL JUROR #13: I worked for Simplot 
20 for 37 years, and I don't think it would impact my 
21 decision one way or another for me. 
22 MR. DENSLEY: Okay. So your experience on a 
23 union wouldn't impair your ability to treat Union 
24 Pacific fairly? 
25 POTENTIAL JUROR #13: No. 
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1 POTENTIAL JUROR: Yes. 
2 MR. DENSLEY: Is there anything about that 
3 that would impair your ability to treat Union Pacific 
4 fairly? 
5 POTENTIAL JUROR: No. 
6 MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Let's see. You next. 
7 POTENTIAL JUROR: I have a brother that's in 
8 IBEW, Idaho Board of Electrical Workers, union 29. 
9 My brother, my grandfather, and my father were all 
10 members of Union Pacific Railroad as well as my other 
11 grandfather and three other uncles. 
12 MR. DENSLEY: So anything with respect to 
13 those instances or those experiences that would 
14 impair your ability to treat Union Pacific fairly? 
15 POTENTIAL JUROR: No. 
16 MR. DENSLEY: Okay. Anyone else member of a 
17 union or family member? 
18 Okay. All right. Aside from anything 
19 that anyone's already mentioned, have any of you or 
20 any of your family members been involved in an 
21 industrial accident or in a work related accident or 
22 Injury? Okay. Let's start with you, sir. 
23 POTENTIAL JUROR #5: Hurt my back when I was 
24 working for the hospital. Slipped and fell on a 
25 piece of ice. 
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have two groups raise your hands. And what I'm gOing 
2 to do is just describe for you a spectrum that, you 
3 know, all of us would fit on this spectrum. 
4 At either end of the spectrum would be 
5 people who people who feel like -- and I don't know 
6 if this describes anybody, but people who feel like 
7 they're in total control of events and that their 
8 destiny is in their own hands and everything that 
9 happens to them is as a result of what they've done 
10 and what they have chosen. 
11 The other end of the extreme is people 
12 who feel like they are out of control and that events 
13 control them and they don't get to choose anything, 
14 and events happen to them. All of us fit somewhere 
15 between, and so if I were to ask you to draw a line 
16 right in the middle and ask you to place yourself on 
17 one side or another, how many of you would put 
18 yourself on the side where it tends toward I am in 
19 control of events and I can control my own destiny 
20 and I'm in charge? So can you all raise your own 
21 hand if you feel like you're on that end of the 
22 spectrum? Keep your hands up for a minute. 
23 All right. Now everybody raise your 
24 hand if you feel like you're on the other end of the 
25 spectrum, that events are maybe more in control of 
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1 comes up in a civil case -- we always ask it in a 
2 criminal case, but we probably should ask in a civil 
3 case. We check people's criminal histories, and I 
4 just need to ask you whether or not you've ever been 
5 convicted of a felony? 
6 POTENTIAL JUROR #2: No. 
7 THE COURT: Any charges in the past have 
8 been misdemeanors? 
9 POTENTIAL JUROR #2: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: Very good. That's all I needed 
11 to know. Thank you very much. 
12 Thank you, sir. One of the issues that 
13 sometimes comes up in cases that we always need to 
14 check on is whether or not -- because sometimes 
f5 people check on criminal backgrounds and so forth. 
16 We want to check and see if you have ever been 
17 convicted of a felony. 
18 POTENTIAL JUROR: I hate to say I don't know 
19 on this one, because I know I was convicted on a 
20 felony, but I know it was pre 18. I'm not sure the 
21 situation of that guy. I think they dropped it at 
1 you or that you don't have as much control. Oh, keep 
2 your hands up real quick. 
3 All right. Everybody who didn't raise 
4 their hands. Keep them up for just a second. All 
5 right. Thank you very much. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Now, pass the jury 
7 for cause? 
8 MR. LARSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
9 MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, may we approach? 
10 THE COURT: You may. 
11 (A discussion was held off the record.) 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Leyvas, you may be excused. 
13 Mr. Densley, pass the jury for cause? 
14 MR. DENSLEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Now exercise your 
16 peremptory challenges. 
17 This takes a moment, so just be patient. 
18 MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, may we approach? 
19 (A discussion was held off the record.) 
20 THE COURT: We're going to go in chambers 
21 for a moment. I want to talk to first juror number 
22 two. Mr. Strawn, would you come into chambers, 
23 please? 
24 
25 
(In chambers.) 
THE COURT: One of the things that often 
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1 POTENTIAL JUROR: Well, I tell you what 
2 though, ever since then anything that's been 
3 felony -- oh, like a concealed weapons permit, you 
4 know, like everything that's felony -- my state job, 
5 anything that has ever asked for a felony has never 
6 found it. It's never popped it. It's never -- it's 
7 not like I've been lying to people about it, but I 
8 tell this exact same story. I know that I got a 
9 felony. I think that I was convicted of a felony, 
10 but I also think it fell off my record pre 18. 
11 THE COURT: So you were under 18 when you 
12 got the charge? 
13 POTENTIAL JUROR: Correct. 
14 THE COURT: Which is very rare. Do you want 
15 to know anything more? 
16 MR. DENSLEY: Any post 18 felony 
17 convictions? 
18 POTENTIAL JUROR: No felonies. 
19 
20 
21 
THE COURT: Some misdemeanors maybe? 
POTENTIAL JUROR: Correct. 
THE COURT: Have you ever filed a motion 
22 18, and there's even a very slight possibility that I 22 where anyone has challenged your qualifications to 
23 didn't get it in the first place. But I was 17 -- 23 serve as a juror because you had been convicted of a 
24 THE COURT: Usually a person would remember 24 felony? 
25 if they've been convicted of a felony. 25 POTENTIAL JUROR: No. 
Page 123 Page 124 
1 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. They asked me 
2 what it was. 
3 MR. LARSEN: A withheld judgment, does that 
4 ring any bells? 
5 THE COURT: A withheld judgment, do you 
6 remember that? 
7 POTENTIAL JUROR #36: No. 
S THE COURT: Good for you, I guess. Thank 
9 you very much. I appreciate it. 
10 MR. DENSLEY: I'm not aware of anyone else. 
11 MR. LARSEN: I'm not aware of anyone else 
12 that's been disclosed. 
13 THE COURT: The bottom line here is I don't 
14 know. We'd have to do a lot of checking to find that 
15 out, and --
16 MR. LARSEN: Odds are on her--
17 THE COURT: Odds are that it got dismissed. 
18 That's the odds. I would guess, but there's no way 
19 of knowing for sure. I wonder -- I'll have my clerk 
20 check. 
21 (A recess was taken from 4:23 p.m. to 
22 4:25 p.m.) 
23 THE COURT: She got a dismissal. So no 
24 disqualification. Now my plan here is, just so that 
25 we're clear -- I don't want to have Kutler happen 
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1 (A discussion was held off the record.) 
2 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and 
3 gentlemen, if the following individuals would come, 
4 the marshal will seat you in the jury box in the 
5 order in which you should be seated. In this order: 
6 Mr. Strawn, Mr. Binggeli -- is it Binggeli or 
7 Binggeli? 
8 POTENTIAL JUROR #5: Binggeli. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Drawe, is that right? 
10 Mr. Richardson, Mr. Shurtliff, Mr. Apel -- is it 
11 Apel? 
12 POTENTIAL JUROR #18: Yeah, it's Apel. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. You're next. 
14 Mr. Vialpando, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Smith, Mr. Davis, 
15 Ms. Tolman. 
16 THE DEFENDANT #35: Oh, yeah, there's two of 
17 us. 
18 THE COURT: Oh, Karen. Ms. Heath, and 
19 Stacey Carter. 
20 Okay. Now, the jury's been seated. Is 
21 there any objection from either side to the jury as 
22 seated? 
23 MR. LARSEN: Not from the plaintiff, Your 
24 Honor. 
25 MR. DENSLEY: No objection. 
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1 again. When you exercise your last peremptory, don't 
2 come back and say that I made a mistake. That should 
3 have been somebody else. 
4 MR. LARSEN: We had that happen, and I was 
5 not happy. 
6 THE COURT: No, you were not. 
7 MR. LARSEN: Doesn't make much difference. 
8 THE COURT: So my plan would be to make sure 
9 that I've got the correct jurors, confirm it with you 
10 at the bench, pull those 13 into the box, excuse the 
11 rest, do a little break, and then do the pre-proof 
12 instructions. I at least want to get those done 
13 today. Then we can start with openings and go 
14 through the evidence starting at 9:00 tomorrow. 
15 MR. DENSLEY: How long do you anticipate 
16 going each day? 
17 THE COURT: I'll go at least until 5:00. 
18 I'll go longer if I have to depending on where we are 
19 in the case. This case will be done by Friday. I 
20 can guarantee that. 
21 MR. LARSEN: It should be. 
22 (Out of chambers.) 
23 THE COURT: All right. Counsel, you may 
24 exercise your peremptory challenges. 
25 Counsel approach. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Now, 
2 we're going to -- we're going to excuse the remainder 
3 of the jurors with the exception of I want to visit 
4 with Ms. Klinger before you -- you stay right where 
5 you are for a moment. But the rest of the jurors are 
6 excused and we appreciate your being here. 
7 (Whereupon the remaining jury panel was 
8 excused.) 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Klinger, if you would 
10 come forward, please. Right there is fine. 
11 POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Here? 
12 THE COURT: Can you tell me why you did not 
13 appear at the appropriate time today? 
14 POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Friday I had a very bad 
15 migraine and I didn't even call, so -- . 
16 THE COURT: That's not a very good excuse. 
17 POTENTIALJUROR #8: I know. I'm so sorry. 
18 THE COURT: Because you ultimately appeared 
19 today after being called, I'm not going to issue an 
20 order to show cause and have you appear in front of 
21 Judge Nye and decide whether he should fine you for 
22 not appearing today. But I am gOing to require ~he 
23 jury commissioner to put your name into the next jury 
24 panel. 
25 POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Next list and don't --
2 POTENTIAL JUROR #8: Don't forget. 
3 THE COURT: Don't forget to call next time 
4 or it will be serious. 
5 POTENTIAL JUROR #8: All right. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: All right. 
7 All right. Ladies and gentlemen, if 
8 you'll all stand, please, and raise your right hand. 
9 (Whereupon the jury was sworn.) 
10 THE COURT: Did anyone answer no? You 
11 better not have -- I won't say that. Okay. You may 
12 be seated. What I'm going to do is I'm going to 
13 briefly recess and have you go into the jury room. 
14 If you have any issues at all, medical or anything 
15 like that, let mister -- or Deputy Garcia know. He's 
16 the person who takes care of all of your needs. And 
17 so he will do that and take care of your needs. And 
18 then -- but it's going to be very brief, because what 
1 need to rearrange the courtroom a little bit and then 
2 get you situated in there. 
3 Okay. So don't talk about the case with 
4 each other yet at all. Can't talk about the case 
5 with each other at all during the case until it's all. 
6 done. So that's going to be a blanket rule. I'll 
7 give a little bit more detail with that in a minute, 
8 but don't discuss the case or form an opinion. Okay. 
9 (A recess was taken at 4:38 p.m.) 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 I want -" there's something that I want to complete 19 
20 today. 20 
21 We're going to give you a few 21 
22 instructions before we conclude the day. And once we 22 
23 get those instructions in, then we'll recess for the 23 
24 day and reconvene tomorrow at 9:00. So we're going 24 
25 to take a very brief recess right now for his -- we 
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1 May 15, 2012 
2 9:39 a.m. 
3 
4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Larsen, are you 
5 ready to call your witness? 
6 MR. LARSEN: Mr. Gabiola will be questioning 
7 this witness. 
8 
9 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gabiola. 
MR. GABIOLA: Thank you, Your Honor. Before 
10 we do that, we would like to exclude witnesses. 
11 THE COURT: As previously ordered, if there 
12 are witnesses that are scheduled to testify in this 
13 case in the courtroom they should move to the 
14 hallway. 
15 Call your first witness. 
16 MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, we call Craig 
17 Mulford. 
18 THE COURT: Come forward, Mr. Mulford, stand 
19 before the clerk and be sworn. 
20 
21 CRAIG MULFORD, 
22 (The witness was sworn.) 
23 
24 THE COURT: Please be seated right here in 
25 the witness chair, sir. 
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25 
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You may inquire. 1 
2 
3 
MR. GABIOLA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. GABIOLA: 
6 Q. Can you introduce yourself to the jury 
7 telling them that your full name and where you live? 
8 A. Craig Mulford. I live in Pocatello 
9 here. 
10 Q. Mr. Mulford, how old are you? 
11 A. I'm 62. 
12 Q. Where were you born? 
13 A. I was born in Rosebud, South Dakota, on 
14 the Indian Reservation. 
15 Q. Are you a member of a federally 
16 recognized tribe? 
17 A. Yes, I am. 
18 Q. What tribe is that? 
19 A. Rosebud Sioux Indian Tribe. 
20 Q. Would you provide the jury a brief 
21 history of your educational background? 
22 A. I quit school when I was 16, went on my 
23 own. Later on I went into the service, Navy. I 
24 obtained my GED, and after I was discharged from the 
25 Navy I went to community college for automotive 
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1 Mr. Camacho and Mr. Baker were your supervisors; is 
2 that accurate? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Did either of them ever contact you to 
5 ask you to come back to work as a machinist? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Did either of them ask you to submit to 
8 a physical to see if you could physically go back to 
9 work as a machinist? 
10 A. Not that I know of. 
11 Q. You visited with the railroad's doctor, 
12 Dr. Hegmann; do you recall that? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Did you tell Dr. Hegmann that you would 
15 go back to work as a machinist if you could? 
16 A. I believe so, yes. 
17 Q. Have you looked for any other 
18 employment? 
19 A. Yes, I have. 
20 Q. What have you looked for? 
21 A. I've looked for a lot of part-time work, 
22 because I would like to get into finding out how I 
23 would be able to work or if I could even work. So 
24 I've applied at a lot of auto parts stores, 
25 Converges, Sears. I can't remember everything, 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Did you receive any benefits while you 
3 were working for Union Pacific Railroad? 
4 A. Health benefits. 
5 Q. Any other benefits? 
6 A. Not that I know of. 
7 Q. Did you receive vacation time? 
8 A. Oh, yes, I received vacation time. 
9 Q. Anything else? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Mr. Mulford, is this case important to 
12 you? 
13 A. Yes, it is. 
14 Q. Tell the jury why. 
15 A. Because I've wanted to retire at 66. 
16 That would give me more stability in my retirement 
17 years, and I've already lost three years waiting for 
18 this to come to trial. So that kind of impacts me. 
19 I would just like to be able to retire and have a 
20 halfway decent life for my wife and I. 
21 Q. Are you asking this jury to award you 
22 damages in this case? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. What are you asking them to award you? 
25 A. Whatever's fair. 
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1 but -- Home Depot. 
2 Q. Have you been able to find another job? 
3 A. No, I haven't. 
4 Q. As you sit here today do you still have 
5 problems with your knees? 
6 A. Yes, I do. 
7 Q. What are they? 
8 A. They kind of hurt when I walk up and 
9 down stairs, uneven ground, not enough to say that 
10 they're painful, but they do bother me. 
11 Q. Are you saying today that you don't have 
12 pain in your knees? 
13 A. Not standing, no, I don't. 
14 Q. If you're in a different position do you 
15 have pain in your knees? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What positions are those? 
18 A. Oh, sometimes laying down or if I'm 
19 kneeling or if I'm walking up a hill or walking on 
20 uneven ground, sometimes that bothers me. Walking 
21 upstairs, walking downstairs. 
22 Q. Did you like your job as a machinist? 
23 A. Yes, I did. 
24 Q. Certainly earning a salary that you 
25 testified to earlier was a good thing, right? 
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1 Q. Are you asking them to award you your 
2 lost wages? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Are you asking them to award you pain 
5 and suffering? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Why? 
8 A. Because I went through pain and 
9 suffering after each surgery I had and before I went 
10 into surgery I was in a lot of pain. So--
11 Q. Do you think that Union Pacific did 
12 something wrong on March 28, 2009, that caused you to 
13 trip and fall? 
14 A. Yes, I do. 
15 Q. What is that? 
16 A. They left a bat wing out which would 
17 cause a tripping hazard in a position that would 
18 cause a tripping hazard. They had no cones out that 
19 would indicate where it was. 
20 Q. And in fairness, Mr. Mulford, do you 
21 have some responsibility for the trip and fall in 
22 March 28, 2009? 
23 A. Yes, I do. 
24 Q. Do you have an explanation as to why you 
25 didn't see the bat wing and tripped and fell? 
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with my knee. They said it was a possible ligament 1 impression. 
2 tear. 2 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Did I read that 
3 Q. Okay. Let's look at that exhibit that 
4 your attorneys showed the jury earlier. 
5 MR. DENSLEY: Can you please show the 
6 plaintiff Plaintiff's Exhibit 6? 
7 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Do you have that, 
8 Mr. Mulford? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. All right. If you'/I look In the middle 
11 ofthe document under impression. Let me read this 
12 for you and tell me if I'm reading this right. Under 
13 number three it says rule out meniscus injury of both 
14 the lateral and medial meniscus and also rule out an 
15 anterior cruciate ligament tear or injury; did I read 
16 that correctly? 
17 
18 
A. Where is this at? 
Q. It's right in the middle of the 
19 document. 
20 THE COURT: It's on page three of the 
21 document. 
22 MR. DENSLEY: Oh, I'm sorry. That's right. 
23 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Mr. Mulford, would you 
24 turn to page three? 
25 THE COURT: Page three where it says 
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1 MR. DENSLEY: They've opened the door to 
2 this, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
4 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Mr. Mulford, it's not 
5 the only reason is it? It's not just because you 
6 want to see if you're physically able to do the job. 
7 There's another reason that you're only applying for 
8 part-time work isn't there? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. What is that? 
11 A. Because I'm limited to only so much 
12 amount of money to make. 
13 MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, again I'm going to 
14 object. 
15 THE COURT: Overruled. 
16 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: What is that amount of 
17 money? 
18 MR. GABIOLA: Same objection, Your Honor. 
19 This, again, addresses our motion in limine. 
20 THE COURT: That question is a different 
21 question. That is sustained. I'll sustain the 
22 objection on that. 
23 MR. DENSLEY: All right. 
24 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: So there's a limit of 
25 the amount of money you can make or what happens? 
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3 correctly? 
4 A. Would you reread that for me? 
5 Q. Sure. It says rule out meniscus injury 
6 of both the lateral and medial meniscus and also rule 
7 out an anterior cruciate ligament tear or injury. 
8 A. Okay. 
9 Q. Okay. NOw, we talked a little bit about 
10 jobs that you've applied for; do you recall that 
11 testimony? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And you told the jury that you've been 
14 applying for part-time jobs? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And that the reason that you were 
17 applying for part-time jobs is because you wanted to 
18 see If you're able to do the job and maybe work 
19 full-time, right? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. That's not the only reason that you're 
22 applying for part-time jobs is it? 
23 MR. GJ\BIOLA: Your Honor, I'm going to 
24 object. This raises an issue that we addressed in 
25 our motions in limine. 
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1 MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, same objection. 
2 Irrelevant. It's also been asked and answered. 
3 THE COURT: It's been asked and answered. 
4 Sustained. 
5 MR. DENSLEY: If that's been asked and 
6 answered, I wonder if Mr. Mulford could answer it 
7 again. I'm not sure what the answer was. 
8 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure either. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Answer it again then. 
10 The pending question is: So there's a limit of the 
11 amount of money that you can make or what happens? 
12 That's the question that's pending. You can answer 
13 that question. 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. I can make $780 a month, 
15 and if I make any over that I lose my retirement. 
16 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Okay. And why would 
17 you not apply for -- well, there is an additional 
18 reason why you wouldn't apply for full-time work 
19 isn't there? 
20 A. What would that be? 
21 Q. Well, you recall applying at Ron's Rocky 
22 Mountain Automotive? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. And you testified in your 
25 deposition that you only applied for part-time work? 
Page 252 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And you said it was because they didn't 
3 pay enough money to make it worthwhile. Do you 
4 recall that testimony? 
5 A. To lose my -- no, yes, it's true. 
6 Q. The full-time job? 
7 A. The full-time job. 
S Q. Didn't pay enough money to make it worth 
9 your while? 
10 MR. GABIOLA: Objection, Your Honor. Asked 
11 and answered. 
12 THE COURT: Overruled. 
13 MR. GABIOLA: Again it's irrelevant. 
14 THE COURT: Overruled. 
15 Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Do you recall that? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. So why is it that a full-time 
18 job -- so let's put aside these issues of whether or 
19 not you could work a full-time job physically and 
20 whether or not you would lose any money from your 
1 I'm getting on my retirement. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 MR. LARSEN: Move to strikel Your Honorl 
4 pursuant to the court's previous rUlings. 
5 THE COURT: Overruled. 
6 MR. DENSLEY: That's all the questions that 
7 I havel Mr. Mulford. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Redirect. 
9 MR. GABIOLA: Yes l Your Honor. Thank you. 
10 
11 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. GABIOLA: 
13 Q. Mr. Mulford, you were asked questions 
14 about the FCE; do you recall that? 
15 A. About what? 
16 Q. The FCE, the functional capacity 
17 evaluation--
18 
19 
A. Yes. 
Q. -- that you participated in. Did you do 
20 that at your request or somebody else? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
retirement, because, you know, you're making too much 21 A. UP's request. 
money. Why is it that full-time work at Ron's 22 Q. When did you do that? 
A. I don't recall. Automotive otherwise would not be something that you 23 
would want? 
A. Because, it makes less money than what 
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1 
2 
A. Yes. 
Q. And--
3 MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, I need to object 
4 to that as lacking foundation, assumes facts not in 
5 evidence, and it calls for speculation on 
6 Mr. Mulford's part. He doesn't know who it's been 
7 sent to. 
8 THE COURT: It was asked if he did know. 
9 The objection is overruled. 
10 MR. DENSLEY: Well, Your Honorl the 
11 foundation--
12 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
13 MR. DENSLEY: All right. 
14 Q. MR. GABIOLA: Now, you had the 
15 functional capacity evaluation in February of this 
16 year; is that correct? 
17 A. I believe that's correct. 
18 Q. Have you received any letter from Union 
19 Pacific Railroad saying you can come back to work? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Have you had any contact with anybody 
22 from the railroad saying that you can come back to 
23 work as a machinist? 
24 MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, this has been 
25 asked and answered as well. 
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24 Q. Were you aware that Union Pacific had 
25 sent the results from that test to their own doctor? 
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1 THE COURT: Overruled. This is redirect 
2 examination on the cross. 
3 
4 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. GABIOLA: Thank you. No further 
5 questions. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 Mr. Mulford, appreciate it. You may 
8 step down. 
9 Call your next witness. 
10 MR. GABIOLA: Your Honorl before we dOl I'd 
11 like to take a matter up outside the presence of the 
12 jury. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, 
14 we're going to excuse you for just a moment. 
15 Hopefully it won't be too longl and then we'll come 
16 back. Don't talk to each other again anymore. 
17 (Outside the presence of the jury.) 
18 THE COURT: Take up your matter. 
19 MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, we were objecting 
20 so muchl and I don't think it should be a surprise to 
21 the courtl the purpose of our objection related to 
22 the RRB benefits. 
23 THE COURT: I understand that. 
24 MR. GABIOLA: And the message that the jury 
25 got, which we objected to in our motions in limine 
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1 and the basis here was that's more prejudicial than 
2 probative. 
3 THE COURT: I understand that, Mr. Gabiola. 
4 The reason that I sustained -- or overruled your 
5 objections is that your -- if Mr. Mulford had not 
6 testified on direct examination as to the reason he 
7 was only looking for part-time work, then none of 
8 that would have come in. But once you asked him that 
9 question and he said the reason that he only went for 
10 part-time work is because -- the only reason is 
11 because he wanted to see if he could do it, that 
12 opened the door. The defendant at that point in the 
13 time is certainly entitled to identify for the jury 
14 that he's got other reasons that he does not -- he's 
15 only seeking part-time work. 
16 That's -- mitigation is an issue here. 
17 I wouldn't have allowed it based on my earlier 
18 rulings except for the fact that that's how he 
19 testified on direct. That'sthe problem. 
20 MR. GABIOLA: Well, Your Honor, I'm going to 
21 make a motion. 
22 THE COURT: That opened the door. 
23 MR. GABIOLA: I'm going to move the court 
24 for a mistrial. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 THE COURT: That was my conclusion as well. 
2 That's why I allowed it. Otherwise I would not have. 
3 I'll be perfectly frank, I would not have allowed 
4 that had he not offered that as the reason that he 
5 was only looking for part-time work. So that's the 
6 basis for my ruling. 
7 Anything else that you want to bring up? 
8 MR. DENSLEY: Yes, Your Honor. I do. 
9 THE COURT: Do you have anything else on 
10 that issue? 
11 
12 
MR. GABIOLA: No, Your Honor. 
MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, we had filed a 
13 motion previously on Nancy Collins, and Your Honor 
14 had ruled that Nancy Collins would be allowed to 
15 testify on the basis of their April 6, 2010, report. 
16 THE COURT: Right. 
17 MR. DENSLEY: So I just wanted to bring that 
18 to the court's attention that she needs to be limited 
19 to what's in her April 6, 2010, report and that any 
20 conclusions, any comments, any statements that would 
21 go beyond any information that she received after 
22 that time or any conclusion that she drew after that 
23 time would be beyond what the court has allowed her 
24 to testify to. 
25 THE COURT: Well, the plaintiff took that 
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1 MR. GABIOLA: And preserve my record for 
2 appeal. 
3 THE COURT: Very good. Your motion for a 
4 mistrial is denied. That's the basis for my ruling. 
5 The point here is that he was asked whether or not on 
6 direct examination the reason that he only asked for 
7 part-time work -- or only looked for part-time work. 
8 Once that door is open, then the defense is entitled 
9 to inquire. 
10 MR. GABIOLA: Well, Your Honor, I disagree. 
11 He could testify that he worked part-time and was 
12 looking for part-time work. I don't think that that 
13 necessarily opens the door for them to ask the 
14 question as to why he wasn't because he was receiving 
15 RRB benefits. He testified that he was looking for 
16 part-time work because he wanted to first see if he 
17 could do it or not physically. I don't think that 
18 opened the door, but just preserving the record. 
19 THE COURT: Do you want to make a record on 
20 this, Mr. Densley? 
21 MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, it most certainly 
22 did open the door because Mr. Mulford said the reason 
23 is because I wanted to say see if I could do it. 
24 That's not the only reason. So it would be 
25 misleading the jury to lead them to that. 
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same position in response to your original motion. 
2 So they've already indicated they're not planning on 
3 going beyond. So that's where we are. 
4 MR. DENSLEY: All right. 
5 THE COURT: Is the report in the record as 
6 an exhibit itself? 
7 MR. LARSEN: I think we've listed it, Your 
8 Honor, but it's only for the purpose of illustrative 
9 purposes. 
10 THE COURT: Right. It's for my purpose to 
11 see if it's beyond the scope. What exhibit number is 
12 it? 
13 MR. DENSLEY: I don't think that it was an 
14 exhibit. Oh, 14, and we have objected to it being a 
15 trial exhibit. 
16 MR. LARSEN: I'm not going offer the report, 
17 Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Right. I understand. 
19 MR. DENSLEY: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: I don't think that there was any 
21 expectation that it was going to be offered. So I 
22 just want to have access to it in case you made an 
23 objection that it's beyond the scope of that report 
24 so that I can look at the report and make a ruling. 
25 MR. DENSLEY: Right. And I just want to get 
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1 as much of this out before the jury comes back in so 
2 we didn't have to interrupt the flow of things. 
3 THE COURT: Anything else? 
4 MR. GABIOLA: No, Your Honor. 
S THE COURT: Is that going to be the next 
6 witness? 
7 MR. LARSEN: Yes. That's the next witness. 
8 THE COURT: Very well. Let's bring them 
9 back in. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 (Outside the presence of the jury at 
2 12:02 p.m.) 
3 THE COURT: As Mr. Opp was testifying, some 
4 things occurred to me that kind of vary on the 
5 discussion we had earlier concerning the plaintiff's 
6 testimony about his efforts to seek employment. 
7 Considering the fact that both the 
8 testimony of Ms. Collins and Mr. Opp -- we have the 
1 
2 
3 
May 16,2012 
9:07 a.m. 
4 (Outside the presence of the jury.) 
5 THE COURT: Okay. We're on the record in 
6 Mulford versus Union Pacific Railroad. It's May 16, 
7 2012. We're about to bring the jury in. I'm making 
8 a ruling on a request made by the defense at the 
9 close of the trial yesterday where they asked me to 
10 strike the testimony of Dr. Freeman at page 39 lines 
11 10 through 24 and page 41 lines 10 through 15. 
12 I've reviewed that deposition again and 
13 have concluded that the opinions offered are 
14 epidemiological -- say that ten times -- and that 
15 they can be offered in the case. So I'm not striking 
16 that portion of the testimony. The video has already 
17 been redacted to exclude things that I've already 
18 excluded in prior rulings. So that will be allowed. 
19 Any questions? 
20 MR. LARSEN: No, Your Honor. 
21 MR. DENSLEY: No. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Very good. Let's 
23 get the jury and get rolling. 
24 
25 
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1 was clearly a credibility part of his testimony in 
2 terms of the reasons that he was using for only 
3 seeking part-time work in his testimony yesterday. 
4 But there should not be substantive testimony as to 
5 what the actual value of part-time work is, the types 
6 of jobs that he could do for part-time work, or the 
7 reasons that he's only seeking part-time work since 
8 the plaintiff is assuming a full-time position for 
9 plaintiff claiming that his lost income claims both 9 both his lost income claims past and future. 
10 past and future wages three or four years until his 10 So my inclination as I sit here today 
11 retirement date should be reduced by a minimum of the 11 after listening to Mr. Opp's deposition or trial 
12 .17 thousand some odd dollars -- that is the 9.50 an 12 testimony is to not allow defense testimony about 
13 hour that Ms. Collins testified to -- it strikes me 13 part-time work, railroad retirement benefits, any 
14 that the defendant is not in a position to argue 14 calculations as it relates to that. I would allow 
15 anything other than is it possible that, number one, 
16 he wasn't prevented from work at the railroad, and, 
17 number two, could he have had some other job after 
18 August of 2011 that he could have earned more at or 
19 is there another job that he could have earned more 
20 than 17 thousand some odd dollars? 
21 And so for that reason -- I'm just 
22 speaking in generalities now so that you can have the 
23 benefit of some thinking that I was doing as I was 
24 listening to Mr. Opp's testimony. It strikes me that 
25 there should be a limitation on any reference to what 
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15 testimony as to whether or not there were other jobs 
16 that he could have earned more than $17,000 at, 
17 whether he should still -- could still work at the 
18 railroad. I think all of that's fair game, but I'm 
19 not inclined to allow the additional testimony that 
20 we talked about earlier. We weren't on the record 
21 then, so I thought I better make that comment on the 
22 record. 
23 I will allow -- I'm just laying that out 
24 there now. I'll give you a chance to think about it 
25 and allow you be heard on the record before you give 
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2 it? 
3 
THE COURT: Okay. So where would you put 
MR. LARSEN: I think that you just make a 
4 separate instruction that says the parties stipulate. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. And you're okay with such 
6 language? 
7 MR. LARSEN: And I'm all right with that. 
8 THE COURT: Because we often do that. 
9 Parties agree that these facts are not in dispute or 
10 something like that. 
11 MR. LARSEN: Right. 
12 THE COURT: So you'd agree to something like 
13 that? 
14 MR. LARSEN: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Does that address your concern, 
16 Mr. Densley? 
17 MR. DENSLEY: Your Honor, for the record, I 
18 stand by my position. If you're gOing to rule 
19 . against me, I think that's a good way to accommodate, 
20 yes. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Let me make a record 
22 just so -- because we always have to make a record. 
23 We don't do this for anybody but the Supreme Court. 
24 This is my view. My view is that the testimony of 
25 the plaintiff as it went to the reasons for -- the 
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1 And so the question is now is it 
2 substantive testimony to which an expert can respond? 
3 And my view from the outset, the RRB was a collateral 
4 source. Clearly collateral source evidence is almost 
5 never admissible and shouldn't have been in this 
6 case, and I've made that ruling in the motions in 
7 limine for that specific reason. So my view is that 
8 his testimony goes to his credibility, but it 
9 doesn't -- it's not substantive in the sense of what 
10 are his damages, which is really what the mitigation 
11 question is. 
12 And so for those reasons I'm ruling that 
13 the defendant when they call Mr. Van Iderstine may 
14 not have him refer to any of the reasons that he was 
15 only seeking part-time work, may not refer to any of 
16 his railroad retirement disability benefits in any 
17 way, in any dollar amount, can't even make any 
18 mention of it. 
19 I've emphasized, because that's the only 
20 thing that I have to go by, the first full paragraph 
21 on page 18 of Mr. Van Iderstine's report where he 
22 makes -- offers some specific opinions as to that. 
23 I'm not just limiting my ruling to that paragraph. 
24 He can't talk about it. Period. And I'm not going 
25 to allow the defendant to argue that in closing 
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1 reasons that he was not seeking anything more than 
2 part-time work goes to his credibility. Because he 
3 offered an explanation, but it wasn't the full 
4 explanation. 
5 And because I felt that he'd opened the 
6 door on that I allowed the defendant to inquire are 
7 there any other reasons and he offered the testimony 
8 that he did? We talked about it as RRB. He never 
9 said Railroad Retirement Benefits. He just said 
10 retirement benefits or benefits or something like 
11 that. And so they don't know what it is or how much 
12 it is, and we have the testimony of Mr. Opp that if 
13 he had worked -- continued to work until age 66, he 
14 could have put more money into the retirement 
15 benefit, and he's lost that. So I think that's kind 
16 of offset I think in terms of the testimony. 
17 But in terms of substantive testimony, I 
18 felt like his answers particularly as it mentioned 
19 specific amounts were beyond the scope of the 
20 question, were not responsive. I offered to the 
21 plaintiffs to strike that or give a cautionary 
22 instruction. You declined that for fear that it 
23 would further taint the jury to add emphasis to it. 
24 And I understand that, but at least that offer was 
25 made and declined. 
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1 argument either. 
2 If you want to say, for example -- and I 
3 don't even know if you want to go there, but if you 
4 wanted to say to the jury in your closing argument 
5 credibility of the witnesses is an issue and I don't 
6 think that you should believe the plaintiff because, 
7 for example, when he was seeking work, he didn't 
8 offer all of the explanations for the reasons that he 
9 wasn't seeking full-time work. In terms of his 
10 credibility, I'll let you go that far and no further. 
11 And I don't even know if you'd want to 
12 go there. But if you do, that's as far as 1'1/ allow 
13 you to go. You can't make any reference to 
14 statements that he made, any retirement benefits, 
15 nothing like that. I'm not going to aI/ow it. So 
16 I'm going to limit the testimony or the issue to that 
17 question so that we're clear on that. 
18 Now, anything else that we need to take 
19 up before we bring the jury in? 
20 MR. HAYDEN: Housekeeping, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MR. HAYDEN: We had those extra exhibits 
23 that we needed to mark. 
24 THE COURT: So what have we marked? Have we 
25 made them as part of Exhibit 10? 
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ADDENDUM B 

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 200 I WL 1607586 (N.D.Ill.) 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 1607586 (N.D. Ill.)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern 
Division. 
Richard L. FERREN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPO-
RATION, a corporation, Defendant. 
No. 00 C 2262. 
Dec. 12, 200 I. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
;i..CHENKIER, Magistrate 1. 
*1 Plaintiff brings this action under Federal Em-
ployer Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.c. § 51, et seq., 
to recover for injuries he allegedly suffered while on 
the job on December 3, 1998. On October 17,2000, by 
virtue of the consent of the parties pursuant to 
.c. § 636(c), the case was transferred to this Court for 
all proceedings, including the entry of final judgment. 
The case is set for a jury trial to commence on Feb-
ruary 12, 2002. Presently before the Court are various 
motions in limine filed by each of the parties. The 
Court's rulings on each of these motions in limine are 
set forth below. 
I. 
The plaintiff has filed five motions in limine, two 
of which are unopposed: plaintiffs motion in limine to 
bar any reference to plaintiffs prior accidents and/or 
injuries and unrelated medical conditions, and plain-
tiffs motion to bar any reference to the character of 
plaintiffs work abilities or habits. Those motions are 
granted. Plaintiffs other three motions in limine are 
opposed by defendant, in whole or in part, and thus 
require some discussion. 
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A. 
Plaintiff has moved in limine to bar any reference 
to all discipline ever imposed by the defendant rail-
road against plaintiff. The defendant does not object to 
this motion, with one exception. Subsequent to his 
injury and his return to work, plaintiff was discharged 
in August 2000 after being accused of sexually har-
assing fellow employees. Defendant argues that to the 
extent that plaintiff claims lost wages for the period 
subsequent to that discharge, defendant should be 
allowed to offer evidence that the lost wages were the 
result of disciplinary measures and not the accident. 
The Court agrees with the defendant-although 
the possibility that defendant's expressed concern will 
in fact materialize seems remote based on the itemi-
zation of alleged damages set forth in the final pretrial 
order, which discloses no claim for lost wages after 
February 15, 2000. Thus, the Court will grant this 
motion in limine, and bar reference to any discipline 
assessed by the defendant railroad against the plaintiff 
However, in the unlikely event that plaintiff is allowed 
to seek lost wages for a period of time subsequent to 
plaintiffs discharge, the Court will pennit defendant 
to offer evidence that the lost wages were the result of 
the termination and not the accident. 
B. 
Plaintiff also has moved to bar any reference to 
allegations that the plaintiff engaged in sexual har-
assment; plaintiffs current work status; or the pending 
administrative appeal of his discharge. Plaintiff argues 
that none of this evidence is relevant, and all of it 
could present the risk of unfair prejudice. Defendant 
offers no response to the unfair prejudice argument, 
and offers as the only theory of relevance that the 
evidence would show plaintiffs bias against the de-
fendant. 
The Court is not persuaded by the defendant's 
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relevance argument. Plainly, the plaintiff is "biased" 
in that he has an interest in the outcome of the case: he 
is seeking to recover money from the defendant. In the 
Court's view, evidence that the plaintiff was termi-
nated (after his return to work and after this lawsuit 
was filed) would be cumulative at best on the question 
of bias. Moreover, any marginal relevance that could 
be extracted from this evidence would be substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and jury 
confusion. The unfair prejudice would stem from the 
risk that ajury, if convinced that plaintiff was a sexual 
harasser, would find him to be an unsavory person and 
thus would be less inclined to find in his favor for that 
reason, whatever the merits of his claim. The risk of 
confusion and waste of time stem from the fact that 
allowing evidence of plaintiffs termination for sexual 
harassment might lead to a "trial within a trial," with 
the plaintiff attempting to show why the sexual har-
assment accusation was incorrect and the defendant 
trying to prove the contrary-none of which would 
shed light on the issues presented by plaintiffs FELA 
claim. 
*2 Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs mo-
tion to bar reference to the allegations of sexual har-
assment or to plaintiffs termination based on the 
charges of sexual harassment. However, in line with 
the Court's ruling above, the Court will allow de-
fendant to offer evidence that plaintiff was terminated 
from defendant's employ as of a certain date as a dis-
ciplinary measure, in the event that plaintiff is allowed 
to seek lost wages for the period oftime subsequent to 
that termination. 
C. 
Plaintiff has moved in limine to bar evidence of 
benefits received by plaintiff from collateral sources. 
In particular, plaintiff anticipates that defendant will 
seek to offer evidence that plaintiff's medical expenses 
have been paid by health insurance, and that he has 
received sickness benefits from the Railroad Retire-
ment Board. Defendant does not object to this motion, 
except to the extent that plaintiff may open the door by 
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introducing evidence or argument that the cost of the 
medical bills caused plaintiff to suffer economic 
hardships. 
The Court agrees with this exception posited by 
defendant. Plaintiff is correct that, as a general prop-
osition, evidence of collateral source payments is 
inadmissible in FELA cases. 
Cen/ral. 375 U.S. 253 (1963). In that case, the de-
fendant had offered evidence of Railroad Retirement 
Board payments to show a motive for the plaintiff not 
to return to work, even if he had fully recovered from 
his injuries. The Supreme Court did not find the evi-
dence irrelevant for that purpose, but rather concluded 
that the relevance was clearly outweighed by the 
likelihood that the jury would misuse the evidence for 
an improper purpose: to offset or mitigate damages. 
"-'-~~-'-='-='-'--"-=' The Supreme Court reasoned that 
there "will generally be other evidence having more 
probative value and involving less likelihood of 
prejudice" on the question of a plaintiffs alleged 
"malingering" than on the receipt of disability pay-
ments. fd. at 255. 
The Eichel ruling is thus based not on the lack of 
relevance of collateral source income, but rather on 
the potential for prejudice. As a result, courts gener-
ally have considered the exclusion of collateral source 
income not to be an absolute rule, but instead a de-
termination that will tum on the pmiicular facts of 
each case. See ~~~~~~~~~-""-'-~"'----"~~ 
136 F.3d 838. 840-41 (lst Cir.19..2Jn. That is in 
keeping with the general proposition that where evi-
dence is relevant, the trial court has broad discretion in 
detennining whether its probative value outweighs 
any possible prejudice. !:!.!...~~~-'-'-~"'-"-"-',~'-="-"-= 
752.760 (7th Cir. I 994). In cases outside the specific 
FE LA context, courts have struck the balance in favor 
of allowing collateral source payment evidence to 
impeach a plaintiffs testimony that he retired due to a 
disability rather than to receive a pension, !:!.!...~"-"-~ 
F.3d at 760: to attack the credibility of a plaintiffs 
asseliion that he suffered financial stress as a result of 
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income loss after an accident, 
mens-Elmo AB, 837 F.2d 817.824 (8th Cir.I9..2.[!; and 
to cross examine a plaintiff who had testified that he 
had not visited a doctor again about an injury because 
he had fallen behind in payments of his bills. Gladden 
*3 These cases all reflect that the limitation cre-
ated by the collateral source rule has itself a significant 
limitation: "the barriers which have been created 
against the admission of otherwise relevant evidence 
because of its prejudicial affect do not extend to the 
affirmative volunteering by a plaintiff of testimony 
which breaks into the restricted area." ~="-=~-"= 
F.2d at 485: see also COWI!I1S, 837 F.2d at 824 ("we 
have recognized that a plaintiffs testimony on direct 
examination may make evidence of payments from a 
collateral source relevant and necessary for purposes 
of rebuttal") (cited with approval in Brandl, 30 F.3d at 
7601 Here, ifplaintiff"opens the door" by suggesting 
to the jury that the costs of his medical bills have 
caused him to suffer economic hardship, then the 
Court will permit defendant to rebut that suggestion by 
offering evidence that those bills have been paid 
through health insurance and Railroad Retirement 
Board payments. Of course, in the event that plaintiff 
opens the door to this evidence, the Court will instruct 
the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evi-
dence may be used. 
Accordingly, the Court grants this motion in 
limine; however, if the plaintiff offers evidence that 
the costs of medical bills caused him to suffer eco-
nomic hardship, defendant will be allowed to rebut 
that suggestion by presenting evidence that those 
medical bills have been paid through health insurance 
and Railroad Retirement Board payments. 
II. 
We now tum to the defendant's motions in limine. 
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A. 
The defendant has moved in limine to bar three 
different opinions that plaintiff seeks to offer through 
its expert, Raymond Duffany: (1) that Amtrak failed to 
properly inspect and maintain the D2/D3 switch that 
plaintiff alleges was involved in the accident in a 
manner consistent with "generally accepted industry 
standards and practices"; (2) that after the accident, 
the investigation performed by the Amtrak Investiga-
tion Committee was not properly conducted; and (3) 
that plaintiff worked safely for 32 years prior to the 
accident in question. We address each of these chal-
lenges in tum. 
1. 
In his report, Mr. Duffany expresses the opinion 
that the defendant "failed to inspect and maintain its 
switch consistent with generally accepted industry 
standards and practices" (Pl.'s Resp. Ex. 3 ("Duff any 
Rep.") at 9). Defendant argues that this means that Mr. 
Duffany will offer the opinion that Amtrak should 
have inspected the switches more frequently, an 
opinion that defendant argues Mr. Duffany should not 
be able to offer. Defendant argues that pursuant to 
authority granted under the Federal Railroad Safety 
Act of 1970, ("FRSA"), et seq., the 
Secretary of Transportation has promulgated a regu-
lation specifYing that switches "shall be inspected on 
foot at least monthly." Defend-
ant asserts that this regulation under the FRSA 
"preempts" (or, more properly, supercedes) any 
claims under FELA that inspections had to be con-
ducted more frequently, and that Mr. Duffany there-
fore should not be permitted to testifY that in his 
opinion "generally accepted industry standards and 
practices" required more frequent inspections (Def.'s 
Mem. at 1). 
*4 At the threshold, we note that in its response, 
plaintiff asserts that Mr. Duffany is not going to testifY 
about the frequency of inspections, but rather that the 
quality of the inspections conducted was subpar (Pl.'s 
Resp. at 8). However, the statement of claims set forth 
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by each party in the final pretrial order can be read as 
raising an issue concerning the frequency of inspec-
tions: the plaintiff has asserted that Amtrak was neg-
ligent "[i]n failing to inspect said switch when an 
inspection would have disclosed the inoperable and 
neglected condition of the switch" (Final Pretrial Or-
der, at 2), and the defendant has asserted that plaintiff 
was negligent because he "failed to inspect the switch 
points as required" (Jd., at 3). Moreover, the general 
plu'asing of Mr. Duffany's "failed to inspect" opinion 
is sufficiently open-ended that it could embrace a 
number of variations: (a) that no inspections took 
place at all; (b) that inspections took place, but less 
frequently than the monthly inspections required un-
der the FRSA; (c) that inspections took place at least 
monthly, but should have been conducted more fre-
quently; or (d) that the problem was not the frequency 
of inspections but rather their quality. 
Defendant's argument that the FRSA supercedes 
the opinion Mr. Duffany intends to express would 
apply only to the third variation, and not the others. 
Thus, to the extent that Mr. Duffany intends to express 
any of those variations of the "failure to inspect" 
opinion, the Court denies this motion in limine. F!\I 
However, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to use Mr. 
Duffany to sponsor an argument that inspections were 
inadequate because they did not occur more frequently 
than once a month, we agree with defendant that such 
a claim would be blocked by the FRSA. 
FN 1. Defendant argues that the evidence will 
show that the switch in question was in-
spected at least monthly (Def.'s Mem. at 2). If 
true, of course, this would eliminate the fac-
tual underpinning for any opinion by Mr. 
Duffany that no inspections took place at all, 
or that the inspection regimen was insuffi-
cient because inspections occurred less fre-
quently than once a month. However, we will 
await trial to see if the evidence offered is as 
advertised in the motion. 
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FE LA and the FRS A both share the goal of 
Ci1'.2000) (noting that FE LA imposes on railroads "a 
general duty to provide a safe workplace," and that the 
FRSA requires the Secretary of Transportation, as 
needed, to "prescribe regulations and issue orders for 
every area of railway safety"). The FRSA, enacted 
some 62 years after the passage of FELA, has the 
additional goal of promoting uniformity in the laws 
and regulations governing railroad safety. c.'-"'.'-'-'-'=-'''-
.., J 8 F.3d at 776. In Waymire, the Seventh Circuit held 
that a plaintiff in a FELA case could not assert claims 
of liability based on alleged unsafe speed and inade-
quate warning devices that were inconsistent with the 
FRSA regulations on those subjects.ld. at 775-76. For 
purposes of this case, we find pmiicularly instructive 
the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the claim based on 
unsafe speed. Id. 
In Waymire, the relevant FRSA regulation speci-
fied that the speed of the train could not exceed sixty 
miles per hour. The collision at issue occurred with the 
train traveling twenty to twenty-three miles per hour, 
which plaintiff argued was an unsafe speed in the 
circumstances. The Seventh Circuit drew on the deci-
sion in C5'X Ti"ansportatioll. fllc. v. Easterwood. 507 
U.S. 658 (1993), in which the Supreme Court held that 
a state law negligence claim based on excessive speed 
was preempted by the FRS A speed regulations. The 
Seventh Circuit also considered the conflicting district 
court authority on whether FE LA claims based on 
assertions of unsafe speed are superceded by the 
FRSA, and concluded that "in light of [the] FRSA's 
goal ofunifonnity and the Supreme Court's holding in 
Easterwood," a FELA negligence claim based upon 
the speed ofthe train is "superceded by FRSA and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder." 218 F.3d at 776. 
*5 We believe that in light of the FRS A regula-
tion here prescribing that switch inspections must take 
place at least monthly, the rationale of Waymire ap-
plies to any claim under FELA that it was negligent 
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for defendant to fail to inspect more often than once 
per month. Certainly, one might argue that even 
though the FRS A requires inspections at least once per 
month, specific circumstances in a given case might 
have required more frequent inspections. However, 
the Waymire court noted that this argument was spe-
cifically made by the plaintiff in Easterwood, who 
asserted that FRSA regulations prescribing maximum 
speeds were simply a ceiling and did not preclude an 
argument that lower speeds were negligent. The 
Waymire court explained that such an argument would 
arguably leave "room for railroad liability if the 
plaintiff could show the conditions favored lower 
speeds," but that this argument had been rejected by 
the Easterwood court. Wavmire 218 F.3d <)076. The 
Waymire court found that reasoning persuasive when 
considering the interplay between the FRSA and 
FELA as respects speed limitations. Jd We see no 
reason that the same analysis would not apply here to 
the FRSA regulations concerning frequency of in-
spections. 
Citing Grimes v. Norfi)/k Southern Rai!waj' Co, 
116 F.Sllpp.2d 995 (N.D.lnd.2000) as his lead au-
thority, plaintiff argues that the Waymire decision 
should not apply to the FRSA inspection regulation 
here, which plaintiff asserts presents "almost the same 
issue" as presented in Grimes (Pl.'s Resp. at 9). The 
Court disagrees. The specific FRS A regulations at 
issue in Grimes did not specifically address the neg-
ligence claimed by the plaintiff in that case. While 
there was an FRSA regulation specifying the speed to 
be used when using a vehicle to inspect when passing 
over crossings, the regulation was silent as to the 
speed to be used when inspecting areas between 
crossings, which was one area of negligence alleged 
by the plaintiff. And, the FRSA regulations were silent 
on the question of walkways to be used by employees 
inspecting rail cars, which was another aspect of the 
negligence alleged. Grimes. 116 F.Sllpp.2d at 1002. 
On these facts, the Grimes court refused to extend the 
Waymire decision "well beyond its holding to pre-
clude an negligence claim under FELA for any con-
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duct by the railroad even remotely covered by a reg-
ulation enacted under FRSA." Ie/. at ] 003. We do not 
quarrel with the proposition that for a FE LA claim to 
be superceded, the FRSA must specifically address the 
conduct that plaintiff alleges is negligent. But contrary 
to plaintiffs suggestion, we believe that the FRSA 
regulation concerning frequency of inspections here, 
as the FRSA regulations at issue in Waymire and in 
contrast to those at issue in Grimes, specifically would 
cover a claim that the frequency of inspections was 
negligent. 
All of this, of course, should not matter in this 
case, since plaintiff asserts in his memorandum that 
Mr. Duffany has no intention of offering an opinion 
that "defendant was negligent based upon the fre-
quency of the switch inspection" (Pl.'s Resp. at 8). In 
any event, the Court hereby makes it clear that Mr. 
Duffany will not be permitted to offer an opinion that 
the failure to inspect more often than one time per 
month constitutes conduct that is negligent or outside 
"generally accepted industry standards and practices." 
To that limited extent, defendant's motion in limine is 
granted. But insofar as Mr. Duffany seeks to express 
opinions that no inspections or fewer than one in-
spection per month were conducted, or that the quality 
of the inspections were subpar, those opinions would 
not be barred by Waymire. Accordingly, to the extent 
that the motion in limine seeks to bar those other 
opinions based on Waymire, the motion is denied. 
2. 
*6 Defendant seeks to bar Mr. Duffany from of-
fering the opinion that the Amtrak Investigation 
Committee failed to perform a thorough investigation 
after the incident. Defendant argues that such an 
opinion would be irrelevant, because the issue to be 
decided by the jury is not the quality of Amtrak's 
post-accident investigation but rather whether 
Amtrak's actions or inactions caused the claimed in-
cident and injuries. Plaintiff argues that Mr. Duffany's 
opinions concerning the quality of the Amtrak 
post-accident investigation is relevant to Amtrak's 
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defense, set forth in the Final Pretrial Order (Final 
Pretrial Order, at 2-3), that plaintiff caused or con-
tributed to his own injuries by his own negligence 
(Pl.'s Resp. at 11). Plaintiff argues that the contribu-
tory negligence defense is based largely (if not exclu-
sively) on Amtrak's post-accident investigation, and 
that evidence that the investigation was improperly 
conducted therefore would be relevant to that defense. 
We agree with plaintiff on this point. We also 
agree that opinion testimony by Mr. Duffany con-
cerning the quality ofthat investigation, and whether it 
was conducted in a way that such inspections normally 
are conducted in the industry, would assist the jury in 
assessing the credibility of the Amtrak post-accident 
investigation. Defendant argues that it is enough for 
plaintiff to cross examine the Committee members to 
test their conclusions, and that the jury "does not need 
an 'expert' to help them decide what weight to give 
the committee's conclusion" (Def.'s Mem. at 4. n. 2). 
Certainly, cross examination can establish what was 
done, or not done, in the investigation. But, Mr. 
Duffany's opinion may assist the jury in determining 
what a typical investigation in the industry would 
include and whether any omissions are significant. 
Thus, we believe the proposed testimony of Mr. 
Duffany meets the threshold standard of Federal Rule 
=-=-'--"='-"-"~~ of being the type ofinfonnation that 
would "assist the trier of facts to understand the evi-
dence." Moreover, Amtrak offers no argument that 
Mr. Duffany is not an expert within the meaning of 
.o...=c.=--,-==-' or that his opinions about the investigation 
fail to meet the other requirements of Ac-
cordingly, defendant's motion to bar Mr. Duffany's 
opinions concerning the Amtrak post-accident inves-
tigation is denied. 
3. 
Defendant also seeks to bar Mr. Duffany from 
testifYing that "Mr. Ferren had apparently operated 
switches [of the type in issue] for over thirty-two years 
in a safe manner and there is no credible evidence in 
the record to indicate he violated any of the safety 
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rules as outlined by the defendant in its investigation" 
(Duffany Report, at 9). Defendant argues that this 
opinion would be an improper effort to suggest to the 
jury that because plaintiff allegedly had a 32-year 
history of working safely, it is more likely than not 
that he was working safely at the time of the accident 
(Def .'s Mem. at 4). Plaintiff disavows any intent to 
offer an opinion that plaintiffs "general care in the 
past renders his conduct at the time of the accident 
non-negligent" (Pl.'s Resp. at 12). Plaintiff instead 
argues that Mr. Duffany's opinion is relevant for other 
purposes. 
*7 Insofar as Mr. Duffany seeks to offer the 
opinion that plaintiff did not violate any safety rules in 
connection with the accident, that opinion certainly 
would be relevant to address Amtrak's defense that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. So long as Mr. 
Duffany has a sufficient basis under Rule 702 to offer 
an opinion on that subject (and Amtrak's papers do not 
suggest otherwise), he may offer the opinion that 
plaintiff was not negligent in the ways that defendant 
alleges. 
However, plaintiff has offered no explanation of 
the relevance of any opinions concerning plaintiffs 
alleged faithfulness to safety rules during the prior 32 
years of his employment. The only purpose that we 
can see for such an opinion is to suggest that plaintiffs 
track record of safe conduct suggests that he was also 
conducting himself safely at the time that of the ac-
cident-which is, of course, the impennissible pur-
pose that plaintiff has renounced. On this point, we 
agree with the defendant, and therefore grant de-
fendant's motion to bar Mr. Duffany from offering the 
opinion that Mr. Ferren had operated switches of the 
type involved in the accident for more than 32 years in 
a safe manner. 
B. 
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff 
from offering evidence that there were defects in 
switches other than the switch involved in plaintiffs 
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alleged injury. Defendant argues that to establish 
liability, plaintiff must show that defendant had notice 
of a defect in the particular D2/D3 switch at issue, and 
that notice of alleged defects in other switches would 
be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to defendant. 
Plaintiff argues that evidence of other switches would 
be highly relevant to show notice, on the theory that 
defendant's knowledge of defects in other switches 
would have provided defendant with at least con-
structive notice of the dangerous condition in the 
switch involved here (PI.'s Resp. at 12-13). 
Plaintiff is correct that "actual or constructive 
knowledge of the hazard is an essential element of a 
plaintiffs cause of action" under FELA. Williams v. 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation. No. 96 C 
8637. 19
c
97 WL 754175. '" 3 (N.D.lll. Nov. fO. 1997), 
affd, 16] F.3d 1059 (7th Cir.199.]2. Evidence of de-
fects in other switches might be relevant to the ques-
tion of notice, but only if they pertain to the specific 
type of switch in question (the D2/D3 switch) and if 
the defect involved the same problem alleged here 
(that ballast had been deposited in the switch point 
area). If these two conditions were met, then the evi-
dence not only would be relevant, but in the Court's 
view its probative value on the question of notice 
would outweigh any arguable prejudice from the ad-
mission of that evidence. 
However, at this point, plaintiff has not offered 
evidence that these conditions are met: plaintiff argues 
that evidence of "the condition of other switches in 
defendant's yard" should be admitted, without speci-
fYing whether they were the same types of switch in 
issue here or whether the condition of those other 
switches was the same condition that is alleged to be 
defective here. Accordingly, defendant's motion in 
limine to bar evidence of other defective switches is 
granted. However, at trial, the Court will give plaintiff 
an opportunity, outside the presence of the jury, to 
explain the evidence it would offer to show that these 
conditions may be met; if the evidence would be suf-
ficient to support a finding where these conditions are 
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met, then the Court will allow evidence of defects in 
other switches that meet these two conditions. 
C. 
*8 Defendant has moved in limine to bar the 
plaintiff from offering evidence or arguing that pain 
and suffering, disability, loss of enjoyment, loss of a 
normal life, and loss of vitality are separate damages 
claims. Defendant argues that damages for loss of 
enjoyment, a normal life, and vitality are subsumed 
within pain and suffering, and are not separate and 
independent elements of damages. Plaintiff does not 
quarrel with that proposition, and does argue that he 
should be able to assert separate and distinct claims for 
each of those species of damages. Rather, plaintiff 
argues that he should not be barred from offering 
evidence concerning these matters, since these are part 
of the damage she alleges he has suffered from the 
accident (Pl.'s Resp. 1-2). 
Both sides are correct. Plaintiff will be allowed to 
offer evidence concerning the extent and nature of his 
pain and suffering, which certainly could include 
evidence of loss of a normal life. On the other hand, 
defendant is correct that loss of a normal life is not a 
separate and independent claim for damages. Ac-
cordingly, the Court will grant defendant's motion in 
limine insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from offering 
evidence or argument that the claims for loss of a 
normal life (or loss of enjoyment and vitality) are 
separate claims. However, the motion is denied inso-
far as it seeks to bar the plaintiff from offering evi-
dence and argument that his pain and suffering dam-
ages include those items. As for defendant's request 
concerning the jury instructions on this matter, the 
Court will address that question at the instruction 
conference. 
D. 
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff 
from offering evidence or making any statement or 
argument to the jury that (I) FELA is the plaintiffs 
sole remedy; (2) the plaintiff is not eligible for work-
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ers' compensation benefits; and (3) the congressional 
intent behind FELA was to allow a plaintiff to recover 
more easily than in a common law matter. Once again, 
there does not seem to be much true disagreement 
between the parties on this motion. Plaintiff states that 
he has no objection to an order barring him from ar-
guing that FELA is plaintiffs sole remedy or that he is 
ineligible for workers' compensation benefits, and 
from making any reference to the congressional intent 
behind FELA (Pl.'s Resp. at 2). Accordingly, this 
motion is granted. However, this ruling will not bar 
plaintiff (or, for that matter, defendant) from arguing 
to the jury the burden of proof, so long as that argu-
ment is consistent with the jury instructions that the 
Court ultimately decides to give. 
E. 
Defendant has filed an omnibus motion in limine 
regarding "general matters." Several of those general 
matters--defendant's request to bar testimony or evi-
dence regarding (1) defendant's net worth, corporate 
earnings or punitive damages; (2) defendant's size, 
corporate status, power or wealth; and (3) settlement 
discussions--are unopposed, and therefore are 
granted without further discussion. The remaining 
portions of this omnibus motion in limine are con-
tested in whole or part, and are decided below. 
1. 
*9 Defendant seeks to bar any testimony sug-
gesting that the defendant is insured, or suggesting 
that the plaintiff does (or does not) possess medical 
insurance. Plaintiff does not object to this motion 
insofar as it seeks to bar reference to defendant's in-
surance status. However, plaintiff asserts that he 
should be allowed to offer evidence of loss of insur-
ance coverage to the extent that that is part of the 
fringe benefits included in his lost wages claim. 
Under -'--==~'-'-=~'-'-'-''-'-'-'='''-''--'-'--'-, "[ e ]vidence 
that a person was or was not insured against liability is 
not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted 
negligently or otherwise wrongfully." This rule was 
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adopted to address the concern that "knowledge of the 
presence or absence of liability insurance would in-
duce juries to decide cases on improper grounds." 
Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 41 I; see also BUItron v. S'heehan. 200 I WL 
J ] J 028. at *4 (N.DJII. Feb. /, /00 I ); DFC Commu-
l1ications Corp. v. Eames. 929 F.Supp. 239. 242 
CE.D.Tex.1996). 
However, Rule 411 provides that evidence of 
insurance against liability is not excluded when of-
fered for another purpose. See, e.g., PoslTape Assoc. 
Cir. J 97Q}; BraZill v. Lorillard, Inc .. No. 94 C 976. 
1996 WL 14033. at" I (N.D.lIl.Jan. I L 1996). In this 
case, evidence that medical insurance was part of the 
fringe benefits that plaintiff claims to have lost is 
relevant for just such another purpose: establishing his 
alleged damages. Moreover, allowing evidence of 
plaintiffs alleged loss of medical insurance would not 
implicate the concerns that ==-'-"-'- was adopted to 
address, since it would not tempt a jury to decide the 
case on the improper ground that defendant is a deep 
(insured) pocket. Indeed, a case can be 
made-although plaintiff does not attempt to do 
so-that ~~'-'-'- does not apply here at alI, since this 
portion of the motion is not directed to insurance 
against liability but rather medical coverage. 
For these reasons, defendant's motion in limine is 
granted insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from arguing 
to the jury that defendant was or was not insured 
against liability; the motion is denied insofar as it 
seeks to bar plaintiff from offering evidence of the 
fringe benefits he lost when he was unable to work due 
to his injury. 
2. 
Defendant seeks to bar plaintiff from offering 
evidence of his character. Plaintiff does not object to 
this motion, but seeks to reserve the ability to offer 
character evidence to "rebut any testimony proffered 
by defendant's witnesses" (Pl.'s Resp. at 3). 
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Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), evidence 
of a person's character is not admissible for the pur-
pose of proving that he acted in conformity with that 
character trait on a particular occasion. Rule 608 pro-
vides a limited exception to that Rule: it provides that 
evidence of a truthful character is admissible "if the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or other-
wise." However, we note that not just any attack on 
the credibility of particular testimony is sufficient by 
itself to trigger Rule 608: the "mere fact that a witness 
is contradicted by other evidence in the case does not 
constitute an attack upon his reputation for truth and 
veracity." United Stares v. Jackson. 588 F.2d 1046, 
1055 (5th Cir.1979). To bring the exception in Rule 
608 into play, the attack must not be merely on the 
truthfulness of the particular testimony, but rather on 
the character of the witness for truthfulness. 
*10 Accordingly, defendant's motion in limine 
barring plaintiff from offering testimony regarding 
plaintiffs character is granted; however, in the event 
that defendant opens the door by attacking plaintiffs 
character for truthfulness, plaintiff will be able to offer 
in rebuttal evidence of a character for truthfulness. 
3. 
Defendant seeks to bar statements by plaintiff as 
to what he may have been told by various doctors 
concerning his medical condition, arguing that such 
testimony would be inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff 
argues that statements made by the physicians would 
be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), 
"because these statements go to plaintiffs state of 
mind in electing to undergo the medical treatment he 
received, such as physical therapy and surgery" (P!.'s 
Resp. at 4). 
We do not find persuasive plaintiffs citation to 
Rule 803(3). That Rule creates an exception to the 
hearsay rule for a "statement of the declarant's then 
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existing state of mind" Rule 803(3) (emphasis added). 
As for the testimony that plaintiff may wish to offer 
concerning statements made by plaintiffs doctors, the 
doctors (not plaintiff) would be the declarant, and their 
individual states of mind would be irrelevant. 
Plaintiff also cites to f'vfoss v. Feldmever. 979 F .2d 
]454 (10th Cir.1992), to support his assertion that 
statements by plaintiffs physicians should be admis-
sible. Feldmeyer involved a suit between the plain-
tiff/patient and the defendant/doctor, alleging that the 
death of plaintiffs decedent was caused by the de-
fendant's negligence and misdiagnosis. In that case, 
the testimony at issue was directly relevant to resolve 
the dispute concerning the relationship between the 
physician and the patient, and the testimony con-
cerning what the decedent allegedly said was plainly 
relevant to establishing her state of mind and what she 
did in response to the advice of the physician. In those 
circumstances, the court found that "the challenged 
testimony was a continuum of the physician/patient 
relationship and admissible under both -'-=~=-:-'=, 
803(3) and (4)." ~~-'-".L~~~-=-,,~~~. 
In this case, by contrast, there is no dispute pre-
sented here between plaintiff and his treating physi-
cians. Unlike the case in Feldmeyer, Rule 803(4) does 
not apply here. In that case, the doctor was allowed to 
testify concerning statements made by the patient for 
the purposes of medical treatment; in this case, by 
contrast, plaintiff seeks to offer not his statement to 
the doctors but rather what the doctors said to him. 
Accordingly, we find that Fetdmeyer does not support 
the plaintiffs effort to admit through plaintiff (or other 
witnesses) what he was told by his doctors. 
For these reasons, the Court grants this motion in 
limine. We note that this ruling should not limit 
plaintiff in his ability to establish the nature of his 
injuries, as he has identified in the pretrial order two 
doctors who will testify at trial on his behalf, and six 
other doctors and three physical therapists who also 
may testify on his behalf. 
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F. 
*11 Defendant has moved in limine to bar evi-
dence of plaintiffs medical bills. Defendant argues 
that the bills were paid by a group insurance policy as 
required under collective bargaining agreement, and 
thus are not properly included in damages. Varl!o! v. 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. d/b/a Amtrak, 909 
F.2d 1557. 1565 (7th Cir.1990). In addition, defendant 
argues that the medical bills are inadmissible to show 
the extent of plaintiffs injuries. Vurhol. 909 F.2d at 
We agree with defendant's argument, and so does 
plaintiff-with one exception. Plaintiff argues that he 
should be allowed to offer evidence of any medical 
bills either that he has paid personally (and presuma-
bly for which he has not been reimbursed), and which 
remain outstanding. We agree with that exception. 
Accordingly, we grant defendant's motion in limine to 
bar evidence of medical bills that have been paid 
through insurance policies. This order does not bar 
plaintiff from offering evidence of medical bills that 
he has paid personally (and for which he has not re-
ceived or claimed reimbursement through insurance), 
or which remain outstanding and unpaid (and for 
which no insurance coverage exists) .. 
G. 
Defendant has moved to preclude plaintiff from 
seeking to recover gross lost wages. Plaintiff agrees 
that federal and state taxes (which the Court considers 
would include social security tax) should be excluded, 
but objects to the other reductions which defendant 
argues must be made. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff should be required 
to reduce from his calculation of lost wages railroad 
retirement tax payments that the defendant says 
plaintiff did not have to make during the period he did 
not work due to his injury. However, plaintiff has cited 
a provision of the tax code that indicates that payments 
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made to an employee in a personal injury action are 
subject to railroad retirement taxes, to the extent that 
the payments are for time lost (as opposed to other 
factors, such as pain and suffering). Plaintiff 
acknowledges that if he receives an award of lost 
wages for his injuries, he will be responsible for pay-
ing railroad retirement taxes on that amount. Given 
this concession, we see no reason to require plaintiff to 
exclude railroad retirement taxes from the lost wages 
contribution. 
Defendant further argues that plaintiff should be 
required to reduce from lost wages payments for union 
dues, transportation expenses and special clothing or 
safety equipment which he did not have to expend due 
to his absence from work during the period of his 
injury. Plaintiff did not respond to this aspect of the 
motion, but none of the cases that defendant cites 
speak to the issue of deducting these kinds of items 
from gross income. Accordingly, the Court will not 
require plaintiff to deduct these items from his lost 
wages calculation; however, defendant will be free to 
cross examine plaintiff on these matters to establish 
that the lost wage calculation is inflated. 
*12 Finally, defendant argues that the lost wage 
calculation must be reduced to present cash value. 
Again, plaintiff does not respond to this argument, but 
in the Court's judgment, plaintiff does not need to do 
so. All of the lost wages that plaintiff claims accrued 
between December 3, 1998 and February 15, 2000. 
Thus, all the lost wages at issue in this case are past 
lost wages. Reduction to present value is relevant only 
when the issue is future lost wages. Accordingly, this 
portion of defendant's motion is denied. 
H. 
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff 
from claiming that he lost contributions to his 401 (k) 
account. Defendant's theory is that 401 (k) contribu-
tions are made by deducting a certain amount from a 
plaintiffs gross wages, and are not paid by Amtrak on 
top of gross wages. According to the defendant, 
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p lainti ff already is seeking to recover any amounts that 
would have been contributed to a 40 I (k) fund by 
seeking lost wages, which would include his 40 I (k) 
contributions. Defendant thus argues that any separate 
request for recovery of 401(k) contributions would be 
a double recovery. 
Plaintiff argues that this is not the case, and a 
copy of a W2 statement for 1997 that he submitted 
with his memorandum in opposition to this motion 
appears to support his position. The W2 statement 
contains a separate box listing wages, tips and other 
compensation, and contributions to the 40 I (k), and 
then totals those together in another box to come to a 
total "tier I wage." Accordingly, based on the infor-
mation submitted by the parties, the Court denies 
defendant's motion in limine. 
1. 
Defendant has moved in limine to bar claims for 
lost vacation pay and lost productivity pay. The Court 
has considered the parties' arguments on this point, 
and believes that plaintiff has the better of the issue. 
Accordingly, defendant's motions to bar plaintiff from 
offering evidence of lost wages and lost productivity 
pay are denied. However, that ruling is without prej-
udice to defendant offering evidence, should it so 
choose, to support its interpretation of the lost wage 
and lost productivity rules. 
K. 
Defendant has moved in limine to bar plaintiff 
from offering evidence concerning lost wages for the 
time period that he did not work due to a surgery that 
plaintiff claims is unrelated to the accident at issue. 
Defendant asserts that in November 1999, plaintiff 
was put on a work hardening program to prepare him 
to return to work. Defendant argues that this program 
was interrupted in December 1999, when plaintiff 
missed his work hardening sessions for that month 
because he underwent surgery to correct a sleep apnea 
problem that was unrelated to the accident. Defendant 
argues that had he not missed this month of ~ork 
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hardening, plaintiff would have been able to return to 
work as of January I, 2000 rather than February I, 
2000, and that as a result, plaintiffs lost wages claim 
should be reduced by that four week period. 
*13 Plaintiff argues that defendant's position is 
based on speculation, and that no competent proof has 
been elicited during discovery to establish that plain-
tiff was delayed in his ability to return to work because 
of the ~GfILapnea surgery. Each side has argued what 
the evidence will show on this point, without offering 
materials from the discovery record to support their 
contentions. Based on the state of the current record, 
the Court will deny defendant's motion to bar evidence 
of lost wages for the period of his surgery and con-
valescence for the sleep apnea; however, this ruling is 
without prejudice to defendant's right to offer evi-
dence to attempt to establish that, but for the sleep' 
apnea, plaintiff could have returned to work earlier 
than February 1,2000. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as fol-
lows on the motions in limine: 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE. 
I. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference 
to plaintiffs prior acts and/or injuries in unrelated 
medical conditions is GRANTED. 
2. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference 
to the character of plaintiffs work abilities or habits is 
GRANTED. 
3. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference 
to all discipline ever imposed by the defendant rail-
road is GRANTED; however, in the unlikely event 
that plaintiff is allowed to seek lost wages for a period 
of time subsequent to plaintiffs discharge, the Court 
will permit defendant to offer evidence that lost wages 
were the result of the termination and the accident. 
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4. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar any reference 
to allegations that the plaintiff engaged in sexual 
harassment, plaintiffs current work status, or the 
pending administrative appeal of plaintiffs discharge 
is GRANTED; however, the Court will allow de-
fendant to offer evidence that plaintiff was terminated 
from defendant's employ as of a certain date as a dis-
ciplinary measure in the event that plaintiffs allowed 
to seek lost wages for the period of time subsequent to 
that termination. 
5. Plaintiffs motion in limine to bar evidence of 
benefits received by plaintifffrom collateral sources is 
GRANTED; however, if plaintiff opens the door by 
offering evidence that the costs of medical bills caused 
plaintiff to suffer economic hardship, defendant will 
be allowed to offer evidence that the medical bills 
have been paid through health insurance and railroad 
retirement board payments. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE. 
I. Defendant's motion in limine regarding opin-
ions by Raymond Duffany is GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in pmi, as follows: (a) as to Mr. Duffany's 
opinion that Amtrak failed to properly inspect and 
maintain the D2/D3 switch that plaintiff alleges was 
involved in the accident in a manner consistent with 
"generally accepted industry standards and practices," 
the motion is GRANTED only insofar as Mr. Duffany 
seeks to express the opinion that any failure to inspect 
more than once per month constitutes negligent con-
duct; (b) the request to bar Mr. Duffany from offering 
the opinion that the Amtrak Investigation Committee 
did not properly conduct the post-accident investiga-
tion is DENIED; and (c) defendant's request to bar the 
opinion that plaintiff worked safely for thirty-two 
years prior to the accident is GRANTED. 
*142. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plain-
tiff from offering evidence of defects and switches 
other than the switch involved in plaintiffs injury is 
GRANTED, without prejudice to plaintiff attempting 
to make a showing-outside the presence of the ju-
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ry-of the conditions that would make such evidence 
relevant. 
3. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plaintiff 
from offering evidence or argument that loss of nor-
mal life, enjoyment of life, and vitality are separate 
and independent claims is GRANTED; however, this 
ruling will not bar plaintiff from offering evidence and 
argument that his damages or pain and suffering in-
clude those items. 
4. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plaintiff 
from offering evidence or arguing that FELA is 
plaintiffs sole remedy, that plaintiff is not eligible for 
worker's compensation benefits, and that the con-
gressional intent behind FE LA was to allow a plaintiff 
to recover more easily than in a common law matter is 
GRANTED; however, this ruling will not bar the 
parties from arguing the burden of proof to the jury, so 
long as the argument is consistent with the Court's 
instructions. 
5. Defendant's motion in limine regarding "gen-
eral matters" is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 
part, as follows: (a) defendant's request to bar testi-
mony regarding defendant's net worth, corporate 
earnings or punitive damages is GRANTED; (b) de-
fendant's request to bar evidence regarding defend-
ant's size, corporate status, power or wealth is 
GRANTED; (c) defendant's motion in limine to bar 
evidence of settlement discussions is GRANTED; (d) 
defendant's motion to bar evidence regarding insur-
ance is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to bar evidence 
of defendant's insurance status, and is DENIED inso-
far as it seeks to bar plaintiff from offering evidence of 
the fringe benefits he allegedly lost when he was un-
able to work due to his injury; (e) defendant's request 
to bar plaintiff from offering evidence of plaintiffs 
character is GRANTED; however, in the event that 
defendant opens the door by attacking plaintiffs 
character for truthfulness, plaintiff will be able to offer 
in rebuttal evidence of a character for truthfulness; and 
(t) defendant's request to bar statements by plaintiff as 
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to what he may have been told by various doctors 
concerning his medical condition is GRANTED. 
6. Defendant's motion in limine to bar evidence of 
plaintiffs medical bills is GRANTED with respect to 
medical bills that have been paid through insurance 
policies; this order does not bar plaintiff from offering 
evidence of medical bills that he has paid personally 
(and for which he has not received or claimed reim-
bursement through insurance), or which remain out-
standing and unpaid (and for which no insurance 
coverage exists). 
7. Defendant's motion in limine to preclude 
plaintiff from seeking to recover gross lost wages is 
GRANTED insofar as it requires a redact in lost wages 
to account for federal and state taxes; in all other re-
spects, the motion is DENIED. 
*15 8. Defendant's motion in limine to bar plain-
tiff from claiming that he lost contributions to his 
40 I (k) account is DENIED. 
9. Defendant's motion in limine to bar claims for 
lost vacation pay and lost productivity pay is DE-
NIED. 
10. Defendant's motion in limine to require 
plaintiff to reduce his lost wage claim to account for 
the period that he underwent surgery and convales-
cence for a sleep apnea condition is DENIED. 
N.D.Ill.,200 I. 
Ferren v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2001 WL 1607586 
(N.D.IlI.) 
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